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Urban Agriculture and Other
Green Uses: Remaking
the Shrinking City
Catherine J. LaCroix*
For many decades, the primary challenge of land use law has been
how to promote and channel growth.1 Cities encourage new construction and high-value economic activity,2 at the same time that they try to
manage land use patterns through a city plan.3 Disputes over the proper
use of eminent domain arise when cities use this power to encourage
private development;4 disputes over the proper scope of regulatory
power arise when regulators attempt to shape density by restricting development.5 There is an entire body of law on the topic of how to con*Adjunct Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University; former partner, Hogan &
Hartson, L.L.P., Washington, D.C. (environmental practice group). A.B. Harvard College, J.D. University of Michigan. I appreciate the helpful comments and suggestions
offered by Melvyn Durchslag, Jonathan Entin, Alan Madry, and Matthew Rossman.
I am grateful for research assistance from Adam Morris on the Cleveland and Cuyahoga
County Land Banks.
1. E.g., Stuart Meck, Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook xxvii-xxviii
(American Planning Association 2002) (explaining the development of land use law
as necessary to “manage growth and change”); Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer &
Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and Development Regulation Law
18-22 (2d ed. 2007) (history of land use law focused on addressing the challenges of
urban growth); Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law 3.01 (5th ed. 2002) (comprehensive plans are “future oriented” and “project the development of a community to a
future point . . . in the community’s growth.”); Karina Pallagst, Shrinking Cities: Planning Challenges from an International Perspective, in Cities Growing Smaller 10
(2008), available at http://www.cudc.kent.edu/shrink/CGS/cgsdownload.html.
2. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 474 (2005) (upholding New
London’s use of eminent domain to take plaintiff’s small home, to revitalize a blighted
area by comprehensively redeveloping it to include a “waterfront conference hotel,”
restaurants, shopping, a museum, and “research and development office space”).
3. See, e.g., Mandelker, supra note 1, at 3.01 (comprehensive plans “plan for the
physical development of the community”).
4. E.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. 469. The Kelo decision set off an upsurge in “anti-Kelo” state
legislative initiatives, designed to limit the use of regulatory takings to foster redevelopment by private industry. See Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization in the Post-Kelo Era,
34 Fordham Urb. L.J. 657 (2007).
5. See infra Part III; e.g., Constr. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1975); 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Wasco County Court, 703 P.2d 207 (Or. 1985). Oregon’s comprehensive land use planning, with restrictions on development, led to a popular revolt in Ballot Measure 37, adopted in 2004 (and a counter-measure three years later,
as the effects of Measure 37 began to be felt). See MacPherson v. Dep’t of Admin. Servs.,
130 P.3d 308 (Or. 2006) (en banc) (upholding the constitutionality of Measure 37).
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strain rapid growth.6 The modern “smart growth” movement focuses on
areas where growth is pronounced; it seeks to make it better.7 Thus the
underlying assumption of land use law is that economic and population
growth is both our expectation and, when properly shaped, our goal.8
Historically, declining cities have focused on fostering growth and development.9 Urban redevelopment efforts seek to attract businesses to
lift depressed areas from their slump.10 Nobody wants stagnation; the
cure is growth. We often assume that if a city is not growing there is
something wrong.11
In the last several years, however, some cities have begun to openly
address a previously unacknowledged truth: some cities will and do
shrink.12 They lose population and have no foreseeable prospect of regaining it. Certainly we all know this happens: the ghost town is a standard feature of the lore of the American West. But in modern times,
shrinkage has not been an outcome that cities plan for, or embrace.
The land use planning community has begun to grapple with the
issue of the shrinking city. Efforts at institutions such as the Kent State
University Cleveland Urban Design Collaborative13 and the Shrinking
Cities Group at the Institute of Urban and Regional Development at

6. See infra text accompanying note 89. The topic of growth management and
smart growth consumes an entire chapter in two standard treatises. Juergensmeyer &
Roberts, supra note 1; Mandelker, supra note 1, at 3.01.
7. Meck, supra note 1, at xxxi (offering comprehensive recommendations to revise
and improve land use controls, stating “we must grow in a smarter way”).
8. See id.
9. See, e.g., Laura M. Bassett, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Redevelopment: Attracting Private Investment to Serve a Public Purpose—The Example of Michigan, 41 Urb. Law. 755 (2009) (use of tax increment financing to attract high-value new
investment); Wendell E. Pritchett, Beyond Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development
in the 21st Century, 22 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 895, 909 (2006) (explaining that inner ring
suburbs are constrained by the lack of developable land and need to find ways to foster
tax revenue growth through economic development).
10. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 474 (2005); Bassett, supra note 9,
at 756.
11. If a city is not growing, we refer—not to stability—but stagnation or “blight”
(sometimes loosely defined to mean—in essence—unchanged over many years). See,
e.g., Pritchett, supra note 9, at 911 (explaining that “blight” designation in Lakewood,
Ohio is used for any residence without three bedrooms, an attached two-car garage, and
central air conditioning); id. at 912-13, 915 (finding that cities and developers tend to
desire growth).
12. See, e.g., infra note 24 and accompanying text.
13. Cleveland Urban Design Collaborative, Who We Are, www.cudc.kent.edu/
a-whoweare/whoweare.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). As the site explains, the Urban
Design Collaborative
is a community service organization with a professional staff of architects, planners, urban designers, and landscape designers committed to improving the quality of
urban places through technical design assistance, research and advocacy. Supported
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Berkeley14 focus on the shrinking city with this question in mind: how
can we achieve managed, “smart” shrinkage? How can a shrinking city
be made a viable, pleasant place for its remaining residents?
Shrinking cities pose new legal questions. What constraints might
land use law impose on a city’s goals of diminishing its infrastructure
responsibilities, downzoning its land to less intensive uses, or taking
other steps consistent with a goal of managed shrinkage? This article
explores some key issues, using current developments in Cleveland,
Ohio—including an active movement to re-green the city through urban
agriculture and other green uses—as an example. Part I describes the
shrinking cities concept. Part II shows that, although managed shrinkage is a new idea that runs contrary to the land use tradition, existing
land use regulatory tools can be used to implement it. Part III considers
possible legal challenges, particularly takings claims, that the shrinking
city effort might face, particularly when downzoning urban property
for urban agriculture and other green uses. It concludes that takings
issues, though potentially difficult, can for the most part be overcome.
Part III also briefly considers the fairness issues associated with downzoning and the limitations of the current legal structure for revitalizing
brownfields in a setting where traditional redevelopment is unlikely.
This article concludes that thoughtful, careful city planning can help a
city remake itself, even if that process involves encouraging green uses,
such as urban agriculture, that do not fit our traditional understanding
of an urban environment.
I. The Shrinking Cities Challenge

What is a shrinking city? There is no single definition,15 but several cities of the American Northeast can tell you they know it when they see
it. Detroit, Cleveland, Buffalo, and Youngstown, to name a few, share
similar characteristics: long-term trends of significant population decline, associated with the loss or diminution of the industries that caused
the cities to grow in the first place.16 Buffalo’s population, for example,

by the College of Architecture and Environmental Design at Kent State University,
the CUDC offers urban design expertise and applied research in the service of urban
communities, design professionals, and public policy efforts.
Id.
14. Shrinking Cities Group, www-iurd.ced.berkeley.edu/scg/ (last visited Mar. 30,
2010).
15. Pallagst, supra note 1, at 7.
16. Lorlene Hoyt & André Leroux, Voices From the Forgotten Cities
(2007), available at www.youngstown2010.com (follow “forgotten cities” hyperlink);
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has dropped from 580,000 in 1950 to 279,000 in 2005;17 Cleveland’s
has dropped from a high of 914,808 in 1950 to approximately 438,042
in 2007.18 While the suburbs of both of these cities are relatively robust
(though with some signs of decay at the inner ring)19 the cities themselves are hollowed out by dramatic population loss. Jobs in industries
such as steel and auto-making are gone and are not expected to return;20
the cities are victims of a “convergence of factors—poverty, property
speculation, fiscal instability of local government, poorly performing
schools and crime.”21 While each city endeavors to foster development
and redevelopment to combat decay,22 each city also has come to the
conclusion that it cannot expect significant population increases in the
foreseeable future.23
From a land use perspective, the term “shrinking city” is a misnomer;
perhaps “hollowing city” would be more appropriate. Although the typical shrinking city has experienced significant population decline, the
physical footprint of the city itself remains the same size. Cleveland, for
example, is a relatively lightly populated core in a sprawling metropolitan area. Thus the fundamental land use question for such cities is what
to do with their unused or under-used land in the core.
Joseph Schilling, Buffalo as the Nation’s First Living Laboratory for Reclaiming Vacant
Properties in Cities Growing Smaller 33 (2008).
17. Schilling, supra note 16, at 33.
18. Cleveland Land Lab, Re-Imagining a More Sustainable Cleveland:
Citywide Strategies for Reuse of Vacant Land 2 (2008), www.cudc.kent.edu/
shrink/images/reimagining_final_screen-res.pdf [hereinafter Re-Imagining].
19. The Ohio First Suburbs Consortium was established to address problems of urban
decay in inner ring suburbs in cities across Ohio. As its mission statement explains:
“Although the OFSC member-communities are diverse in character, most are built-out
or approaching that condition and virtually all are facing severe economic and fiscal
stress.” Ohio First Suburbs Consortium, www.firstsuburbs.org (last visited Mar. 30,
2010). This is a condition found in other inner ring suburbs nationwide. See Pritchett,
supra note 9, at 909 (suggesting inner ring suburbs are constrained by the lack of developable land and need to find ways to foster tax revenue growth through economic
development).
20. E.g., Pallagst, supra note 1. (attributing urban core population losses to both suburbanization and the “downward spiral” of the manufacturing industry). Youngstown’s
City Plan poignantly notes that, “When steel’s reign came to a screeching halt and the
smoke literally cleared, Youngstown was left with no vision and no plan to deal with the
aftermath. . . .” Thomas A. Finnerty Jr. et al., Youngstown 2010 Citywide Plan
14 (2010), available at www.youngstown2010.com (follow “About Youngstown” to
“Youngstown 2010 Citywide Plan”).
21. Schilling, supra note 16, at 33.
22. See, e.g., City of Cleveland, Development Projects, http://planning.city.cleve
land.oh.us/projects/index.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2010); Youngstown Office of Economic Development, http://www.ytowndevelopment.com (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
23. E.g., Re-Imagining, supra note 18 (“Re-Imagining . . . starts from the premise
that the loss of population over the last 60 years is not likely to be reversed in the near
term . . .”).
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Several of the shrinking cities have considered how best to address
the problem of underpopulation and varying approaches have been adopted. Youngstown has decided to abandon streets, close down infrastructure, and consolidate its remaining population in selected areas.24
In Detroit, there is a grassroots pattern of re-suburbanization, as remaining homeowners acquire adjacent lots for home and garden expansion.25
Cleveland is taking a range of steps of which three are significant here:
the State of Ohio has approved legislation establishing a county-wide
land bank with the power to acquire and demolish buildings on vacant
properties,26 a coalition of government and non-governmental interests
has developed a multi-faceted vision for the future in a recent report,
Re-Imagining a More Sustainable Cleveland, 27 and Cleveland has adopted a specific zoning category for urban gardens, including market
gardens.
Both the land bank and the Re-Imagining report respond to the same
problem: the large number of vacant lots and abandoned buildings found
throughout the most blighted areas of cities like Cleveland. While the
city’s population has been declining for years, the blight accelerated
with the mortgage lending abuses that began to attract attention in
Cleveland as early as 2000.28 As of March 2009, estimates of vacant
houses in the city of Cleveland were as high as 15,000, or more than one
in thirteen.29 Most of Cleveland’s vacant houses are owned by lenders

24. As Youngstown’s Plan notes, the city has lost half its population since 1960.
Finnerty et al., supra note 20, at 30. Large numbers of abandoned properties dot
the city. Id. at 36. As a result, the city concluded that “Not all infrastructure can be
maintained and not all neighborhoods can be returned to their past sustainability.” Id. at
37. The current plan reallocates uses: some abandoned areas of housing and unnecessary commercial zones are redesignated “industrial green”—a new category of “nonpolluting environmentally friendly” industrial use. Id. at 49-51. Overall, the land use
plan calls for a thirty percent decrease in land intended for residential use. Id.; see also
David Streitfeld, An Effort to Save a City by Shrinking It, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2009, at
A12 (discussing comparable efforts in Flint, Michigan).
25. Tobias Amborst et al., Improve Your Lot! in Cities Growing Smaller 33
(2008). This trend developed in the 1990s despite the absence of any municipal mechanism facilitating such purchases. See id. at 58-59; see also Thomas Gunton, Coping
with the Spector of Urban Malaise in a Post Modern Landscape: The Need for a Detroit
Land Bank Authority, 84 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 521 (2007) (discussing a land bank for
the Detroit area that ultimately was approved in November 2006).
26. S.B. 353, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007).
27. Re-Imagining, supra note 18.
28. For an excellent history of the impact of questionable mortgage lending practices
and their resulting waves of foreclosures, see Kermit J. Lind, The Perfect Storm: An
Eyewitness Report from Ground Zero in Cleveland’s Neighborhoods, 17 J. Affordable Housing & Community. Dev. L. 237 (2008).
29. Alex Kotlowitz, All Boarded Up, N.Y. Times, March 8, 2009, § MM, at 28. (“The
city estimates that 10,000 houses, or 1 in 13, are vacant. The county treasurer says it’s
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who foreclosed on the properties, by speculators who purchase foreclosed properties in bulk, or (increasingly) by defaulting owners when
the lender declines to take the property, deeming it a liability more than
an asset.30 Vacant and abandoned buildings attract crime, pose a fire
hazard, and reduce the value of surrounding properties.31 They signal
that a neighborhood is on the decline.32 The land bank offers a mechanism to take public control of distressed properties and direct them to an
appropriate use; the Re-Imagining report envisions new, non-residential
uses for excess properties.
A. The Cuyahoga County Land Bank
In general, a land bank is a governmental entity that takes title to taxdelinquent property, secures the property and perhaps demolishes structures on it, and transfers the property back to private ownership with
a clear title, to ensure that the property can be put to productive (and
tax-paying) use.33 Land banking is not new to Cleveland. The city’s

more likely 15,000.”) Cleveland is not alone in its plight; the foreclosure crisis and
economic decline in some central cities has prompted national concern, as evidenced by
the work of the National Vacant Properties Campaign, which asserts that “according the
Brookings Institution, Vacant and abandoned properties occupy about 15 percent of the
area of the typical large city, more than 12,000 acres on average.” National Vacant Properties Campaign, Smart Growth, http://www.vacantproperties.org/issues/smartgrowth.
html (last visited Mar. 10, 2010); see also John Landis, The Shape of the New American
City: Part Three: The Metropolitan Footprint: Sprawl and Reurbanization: the Changing Shape of Metropolitan America, 626 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 154,
166 (2009) (tracking Census Bureau data to show that, overall, metropolitan areas in
the United States are growing, but that ten of the fifty largest core cities lost population
between 1990 and 2007; “[t]he biggest percentage losers (Detroit, St. Louis, Cleveland,
and Baltimore) were also the biggest absolute losers.”).
30. Kotlowitz, supra note 29; see also Lind, supra note 28, at 238-40 (describing the
history of Cleveland).
31. See, e.g., Thomas Fitzpatrick, Understanding Ohio’s Land Bank Legislation 1 (2009), http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/PolicyDis/pdp25.pdf; Creola
Johnson, Symposium Subprime Meltdown: The Law and Finance of the American Home
Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis: Fight Blight: Cities Sue to Hold Lenders Responsible for
the Rise in Foreclosures and Abandoned Properties, 2008 Utah L. Rev. 1169, 1181-84
(2008) (documenting the impact of vacant housing with examples from Cleveland,
St. Louis, Detroit, and Philadelphia, as well as data gathered by the National League of
Cities and National Fire Protection Agency); David T. Kraut, Hanging Out the No Vacancy Sign: Eliminating the Blight of Vacant Buildings from Urban Areas, 74 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1139 (1999).
32. Fitzpatrick, supra note 31.
33. Matthew J. Samsa, Reclaiming Abandoned Properties: Using Public Nuisance
Suits and Land Banks to Pursue Economic Redevelopment, 56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 189,
213-14 (2008). Other cities that have established land banks include St. Louis, Louisville, Atlanta, and the City of Flint and Genesee County in Michigan. Frank S. Alexander, Land Bank Strategies for Renewing Urban Land, 14 J. Affordable Housing &
Community Dev. L. 140, 146 (2005); see, e.g., Genesee County Land Bank, http://
thelandbank.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
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own land bank was created in the 1970s during the city’s first round
of serious deterioration.34 At that time, the city had more than 11,000
tax delinquent parcels and the city responded by persuading Ohio to
adopt laws authorizing a land bank for such properties.35 “Thousands of
abandoned parcels flowed into the land bank to be administered by the
city’s Community Development Department. [C]heap properties with
cleared, marketable titles”36 were made available through the land bank
to foster redevelopment.37
In recent years, some influential public figures in Cuyahoga County,
in which Cleveland is located, concluded that the city’s own land bank
had some serious shortcomings in addressing the foreclosure crisis
that began in 2000.38 The original Cleveland land bank was adopted
under legislation that authorized a passive land bank program.39 When
the city foreclosed on a tax-delinquent property, the property would be
advertised and offered for sale;40 if not purchased after two auctions,
the land bank could receive the property for management and resale.41
This mechanism allowed speculators to purchase property at auction,
preventing it from reaching the land bank. As the city continued to deteriorate from 2000-2009, hundreds of properties went into the hands
of absentee owners who failed to maintain the properties and allowed
them to continue to deteriorate.42 Moreover, the land bank tended to acquire only unimproved land, in order to avoid the costs associated with
demolishing vacant buildings.43

34. Alexander, supra note 33.
35. Id. at 147.
36. Norman Krumholz, Land Banking and Neighborhood Revitalization in Cleveland, Planners’ Casebook, American Institute of Certified Planners (2002),
reprinted in David L. Callies, Robert H. Freilich & Thomas E. Roberts, Cases
and Materials on Land Use 641 (5th ed. 2008).
37. Id. at 641-42.
38. This group included the Cuyahoga County Treasurer, James Rokakis, and several state legislators. Cuyahoga Land Bank, About the Land Bank, http;//www.cuya
hogalandbank.org/about.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
39. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5722.06 (LexisNexis 2010); see Cleveland, Ohio,
Codified Ordinances tit. XV, ch. 183.021 (2009).
40. Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. §§ 5721.18-19, 5722.03-06 (LexisNexis 2010); see Keri
Blackwell, Model Practices in Tax Foreclosure & Property Disposition:
Cleveland Case Study (2003), http:www.lisc.org/content/publications/detail/797.
41. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5722.03 (LexisNexis 2010); Fitzpatrick, supra
note 31.
42. See Kotlowitz, supra note 29; Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 3-4.
43. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5722.01(F) (LexisNexis 2010); see also § 5722.03
(no statutory authority for acquisition from lenders); Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at
3-4 (discussing how banks only take unimproved land); Blackwell, supra note 40
(describing Cleveland’s tax foreclosure acquisition system).

232

The Urban Lawyer

Vol. 42, No. 2

Spring 2010

In January 2009, the Ohio legislature adopted a measure to authorize
a new form of active, county-wide land bank in Cuyahoga County.44 By
virtue of its county-wide scope, this land bank would include not only
the city of Cleveland but also the relatively prosperous adjacent suburbs
within the county.45 The county land bank would operate as a distinct
legal entity46 with its own sources of funding,47 empowered to acquire
tax-delinquent properties directly without the intervening step of the public auction.48 In addition, the county land bank would be able to negotiate
with lenders to acquire bank-owned foreclosed properties, acquire property as a gift, or purchase properties from individuals.49 Because some of
the properties would be in the suburbs outside Cleveland, they would be
more likely to have value and offer a source of income upon sale. The
county land bank could decide whether a building on the property was
best rehabilitated or demolished. It would be able to bundle clusters of
properties as needed to make them more attractive for development.50
The county’s land bank is in its infancy,51 and is working out its relationship with the cities within the county,52 so at this point it cannot
be known whether it will live up to its promise.53 The county land bank
works with the pre-existing Cleveland City land bank to determine the

44. § 1724.04.
45. § 1724.10 (land bank as agent of the county). Cuyahoga County encompasses
not only the City of Cleveland, but a wide range of adjacent suburbs including Shaker
Heights, Cleveland Heights, Lakewood, and others. See Map of Communities—
Cuyahoga County Board of County Commissioners, http://bocc.cuyahogacounty.us/enUS/map-communities.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
46. §§ 1724.04, 5722.02(B).
47. §§ 1724.02(A), (C), (H), 321.341, .261(A), 307.698, 5705.19(EE), (UU).
48. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 323.78, 1724.02 (LexisNexis 2010).
49. § 1724.02.
50. § 1724.01(B), .02; see also Strategic Land Assembly: Cuyahoga County Ohio
Land Bank, http://www.cuyahogalandbank.org/land_assembly.php (discussing strategic land assembly by the land bank); Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 5-6.
51. The bank was incorporated on April 9, 2009, and named the Cuyahoga County
Land Bank. Cuyahoga County Resolution (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.
cuyahogalandbank.org/documents/organizational/Res_091413_Certified_Incorp_of_
CLRC.pdf
52. By law, any city within the county may reach an agreement concerning property
that flows into the bank, setting general policies and practices for how properties shall
be handled. See § 5722.02(D). For certain properties, any city within the county has a
thirty day “priority right of acquisition” over property that is placed in the county bank.
Id. The Land Bank’s web site notes: “The CCLRC has many options for what to do with
property it acquires, but each Cuyahoga County city is a major partner in the decision
regarding what will be done with properties that lie within its own jurisdiction,” Cuyahoga Land Bank, supra note 38.
53. Already it has been applauded as a “national model,” and the Ohio legislature
is considering authorizing land banks like it in other areas of the state. Cuyahoga Land
Bank, Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Legislation Called “National Model” (Dec. 4,
2009), http://www.cuyahogalandbank.org/articles/20091204_clrc_national_model.php.
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fate of properties within that city.54 If, however, the two land banks control a significant quantity of vacant land in Cleveland, they can be a
source of publicly owned land to be kept in public hands or turned over
to private entities, for use as envisioned in the Re-Imagining report,
described below.55
B. Re-Imagining a More Sustainable Cleveland
Over the past decade, it has become apparent that Cleveland and cities like it are unlikely to return to their industrial past; they must find
new ways to move forward, and take advantage of opportunities for
innovation. Re-Imagining a More Sustainable Cleveland is the city’s
first major step in that new direction, outlining new strategies for using
vacant or under-utilized land.56 While Re-Imagining emphasizes green
infrastructure (such as ecosystem restoration, remediation, and green
space) and productive landscapes (agriculture and alternative energy
such as geothermal and wind turbine power), it is important to acknowledge that the Cleveland City Plan addresses both growth and shrinkage:
the city seeks to attract new development and to foster local engines of
economic growth where possible, focusing on areas of the city where
growth is most promising. At the same time the city recognizes that its
54. § 5722(D). As noted on the Land Bank’s web site, “the City of Cleveland operates its own land bank and will take title to all vacant land produced by CCLRC demolitions within its city limits.” Cuyahoga Land Bank, supra note 38. Cleveland’s land bank
is located within the Community Development department. City of Cleveland Ohio, Division of Real Estate, http://www.city.cleveland.oh.us/CityofCleveland/Home/Govern
ment/CityAgencies/CommunityDevelopment/LandBank (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
55. The Land Bank specifically supports urban agriculture:
The CCLRC will seek to partner with public and private sector organizations to
use the CCLRC’s inventory to support urban agriculture. The CCLRC will assist
community groups wishing to develop and maintain gardens in targeted areas. The
gardens can be a part of a broader water retention or beautification initiative, or a
food distribution network. Parameters will be provided to guide development.
Cuyahoga Land Bank, Demolition and Vacant Lot Re-Use, http://www.cuyahoga
landbank.org/demo_vacant_reuse.php (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). See generally Samsa,
supra note 33 (discussing the characteristics and value of land banking in community
revitalization).
56. Re-Imagining was the result of a one year planning process, in which the cooperating institutions “explored strategies for reuse of vacant land with the goal of
making Cleveland a cleaner, healthier, more beautiful, and economically sound city.”
Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 1. The thirty member working group focused on identifying goals and strategies, policy changes that might be necessary, and opportunities for pilot projects to test its principles. Id. The coalition that prepared the report
consisted of the Cleveland City Planning Commission, the Cleveland Land Lab at the
Cleveland Urban Design Collaborative of Kent State University, and a nonprofit organization, Neighborhood Progress, Inc, with financial support from the Surdna Foundation.
Id. During the summer of 2009, Neighborhood Progress, Inc., funded pilot projects to
investigate some of the strategies identified in Re-Imagining. Neighborhood Progress,
Key Initiatives, http://neighborhoodprogress.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
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long-term health is threatened by vacant and abandoned properties that
are not located in pathways of development, and that new uses for these
properties must be found.57
Consistent with this two-pronged growing and shrinking strategy,
Re-Imagining presents a decision tree for individual vacant sites in the
city. This decision tree, endorsed by the Cleveland City Planning Commission and designed to guide disposition of property in the city’s own
land bank,58 shows how the city envisions allocating property between
green and traditional developmental uses. The city might select ecologically valuable or sensitive properties for preservation through a variety
of uses: alternative energy generation, storm water management (such
as through bio-retention or as a constructed wetland), green space, remediation through bioremediation, phytoremediation, or mycoremediation, or urban agriculture.59 Other properties are assessed to determine
their long-term development potential. Areas with strong development
potential might be designated for a holding strategy: landscaping or bioremediation. For areas with weak development potential, Re-Imagining
identifies the following menu of possible treatments:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Community garden
Bioremediation, phytoremediation, mycoremediation
Constructed wetland
Deep tillage/pavement removal
Basic greening techniques
Solar field
Urban agriculture/commodity farming
Storm water management: riparian setbacks, stream daylighting.60

Although this decision tree formally relates only to sites already in
the city’s possession (properties that have found their way into the city’s
land bank of vacant sites),61 it shows how the Re-Imagining proposal
considers a broad array of uses for excess property in Cleveland.
57. See Cleveland City Plan, http://planning.city.cleveland.oh.us (last visited Mar. 10,
2010).
58. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 9 fig.7. The city land bank is located in the
Community Development Department but land will not be released from the land bank
without approval from the Cleveland City Council. City of Cleveland, supra note 56.
59. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 9 fig.7. Each of the remediation techniques is
a way to use natural processes to clean up mildly contaminated sites. Bio-remediation
uses microbes in soil and groundwater; phytoremediation and mycoremediation work
in the same way, using plants and fungi. Id. at 24.
60. Id. at 9 fig.7.
61. Id. The Re-Imagining report was completed before the county land bank became
operational. The county land bank specifically endorses urban agriculture as a desirable
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Re-Imagining makes clear that its goal is to put all land in Cleveland
to some form of beneficial use; the innovation in the document is its
broad definition of what constitutes beneficial. As the report explains:
Given the large and growing inventory of vacant properties in the City of Cleveland,
it is unlikely that all of the city’s surplus land will be reused for conventional real
estate development in the foreseeable future. The alternative land use strategies described in this document are intended to put vacant properties to productive use in
ways that complement the city’s long-term development objectives.62

Thus the report includes urban agriculture, green space, green energy,
and ecosystem restoration as beneficial land uses. It lists the following
goals:
• Productive use/public benefit. Whether vacant properties are developed with buildings and infrastructure, preserved as open space, or
put into productive use as agriculture or energy generation sites,
they should provide an economic return, a community benefit, and/
or an enhancement to natural ecosystems.
• Ecosystem function. Stormwater management, soil restoration, air
quality, carbon sequestration, urban heat island effects, biodiversity and wildlife habitat should be incorporated into future plans
for vacant sites in the city.
• Remediation. Remove the risk to human health and the environment
from environmental pollutants at vacant sites, either with targeted
remediation projects or with long-term incremental strategies.63
Re-Imagining is a vision document; it does not include specific proposals for particular properties.64 At the end of the document are lists of
recommendations and proposals for further action. At the top of the list:
“Establish a task force to assess and address barriers to new vacant land
reutilization strategies, including zoning, building, and health codes,
access to city land and water, etc.”65
C. The Urban Garden or Urban Agriculture District
In Re-Imagining, Cleveland joins a small but growing number of shrinking cities focusing on green uses as a new way forward. Youngstown,
Ohio has adopted a plan to use its vacant properties for green uses,
use for land that it acquires. Cuyahoga Land Bank, Demolition and Vacant Lot Re-Use,
supra note 55.
62. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 5.
63. Id.
64. While no specific plans or ordinances have followed, grants for pilot projects
were awarded in Summer 2009 and most of those projects will begin in Summer 2010.
65. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 31.
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including a new use category of urban agriculture.66 Urban agriculture
also is making headway in Detroit, where local entrepreneurs working
with Michigan State University have announced plans to establish “the
world’s largest urban farm.”67 Cleveland has taken the unusual step of
adopting a specific zoning category for urban gardens.68
One green use already included in Cleveland’s zoning code is a specific use category, the Urban Garden District. The Cleveland Zoning
Code explains the rationale for the district:
[T]o ensure that urban garden areas are appropriately located and protected to meet
needs for local food production, community health, community education, gardenrelated job training, environmental enhancement, preservation of green space, and
community enjoyment on sites for which urban gardens represent the highest and
best use for the community.69

Thus the city’s goals in fostering urban gardens are two-fold: gardening is by itself a productive use of land, and in addition the city is concerned about inner city “food deserts”70 that contribute to poor nutrition
in many areas of the city.71 The city seeks to ensure that urban gardens
are established as a goal in themselves, not as a holding strategy until it
is time for residential or commercial building construction.72
Cleveland’s urban garden district encompasses both community gardens
and market gardens. A community garden is not a commercial enterprise:
it is “an area of land managed and maintained by a group of individuals . . .
for personal or group use, consumption or donation.”73 A market garden

66. Finnerty, supra note 20, at 47.
67. Hantz Farms Detroit, Introducing Hantz Farms, http://www.hantzfarmsdetroit.
com/introduction.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
68. For a description of urban agriculture zones in the small group of cities that have
taken this step, see Mukherji & Morales, “Zoning for Urban Agriculture,” Zoning Practice (March 2010) (American Planning Ass’n).
69. Cleveland, Ohio, Codified Ordinances tit. VII, ch. 336.01 (2009).
70. “[P]laces where fast food restaurants are prevalent and grocery stores are few,”
Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 26.
71. Id. at 27 fig.25 (map of food deserts and community gardens).
72. Id. at 26-29. The City’s Planning Director informally offers the following explanation:
The principal purpose of the Urban Garden zoning district is to legislatively reserve
certain land for urban gardening, with the necessity for legislation and public notice
mailed to nearby property owners—which is required in zoning legislation—if an
urban garden property were to be made available for another use. . . . A second reason
for the Urban Garden zoning is that it is a little more permissive than is our Residential zoning in permitting fencing that may be needed for an urban garden and in allowing the on-site sale of plantings that are grown on the site (i.e., a “market garden”).
E-mail from Robert N. Brown, Director, Cleveland Planning Commission (Oct. 3,
2009) (on file with author).
73. Cleveland, Ohio, Codified Ordinances tit. VII, ch. 336.02(a) (2009).
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is “an area of land managed and maintained by an individual or group
of individuals to grow and harvest . . . crops . . . to be sold for profit.”74
These two garden uses are the only uses allowed in the Cleveland urban
garden district, but the zoning category allows for either type of garden.
Cleveland currently does not have distinct language for urban commercial
agriculture, but this designation does not appear necessary because it appears that urban agriculture, which tends to be small-scale cultivation of
high value crops, fits within the definition of a market garden.
The uses allowed in the urban garden district are restricted to gardening (with accessory uses such as open space and appropriate signs),
with or without on-site sale of crops.75 No structures are allowed in
the urban garden district, except for small structures associated with
the permitted uses, such as greenhouses, tool-sheds, shade pavilions, or
“rest-room facilities with composting toilets.”76
At this point, a threshold issue must be addressed: why would a city
bother to rezone land for an urban garden? As a practical matter, gardening is permissible in any zoning district; a homeowner does not need
zoning permission, for example, in order to raise vegetables.
As its statement of purpose demonstrates,77 the city sees a distinctive
role for the urban garden district. Re-Imagining envisions urban garden
uses as a desirable end in themselves, not just as an interim use while
the city waits for further development;78 the district helps to protect
the use and foster the urban garden network. A formal zoning designation reserves particular land for urban gardening; the zoning cannot be
changed without re-zoning the property through the standard zoning
legislative process, including notice to neighbors and a public hearing.
Thus the urban garden district is a public and transparent embodiment
of a city policy in favor of such uses. In addition, the urban garden district specifically allows uses of particular importance to urban gardening, including “seasonal farm stands” selling produce—not a use that
would be allowed in a residential district—as well as other amenities
such as restroom facilities and fences up to six feet high.79 Possible private owners of land in the urban garden district include local nonprofit
organizations that foster community gardening for civic or educational
purposes, or a for-profit urban farmer.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. ch. 336.02(b)
Id. chs. 336.03, .04(b)—(c).
Id. ch. 336.04(e).
Id. ch. 336.01.
Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 9.
Id. chs. 336.04, .05.
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II. Can the Land Use Regulatory System be Used for
Managed Shrinkage?

The history of land use law in this country shows that its predominant
focus has been on development and the management of development.80
Most of our modern land use structure is designed around this concern.81
The use of this same regulatory structure to manage shrinkage and deurbanization, rather than growth and urbanization, runs contrary to this
practice, yet the history of the development and adaptation of our land
use regulatory tools shows that they are available for the task.82 One example in this history stands out: the local innovations that led to growth
management programs in some communities in the 1960s and 1970s.83
The growth management story shows how communities can use existing
land use regulatory tools in creative ways to address new challenges.
A. A (Very) Brief History of Land Use Law
Land use regulation has been with us for centuries, as governments seek
to ensure that the public interest is protected against consequences of
disorder and congestion. Early edicts in Elizabethan England focused
on overcrowding: rapid growth in London prompted Parliament to
adopt measures to mitigate the adverse effects on the public welfare
of a “great multitude of people brought to inhabit in small rooms . . .
smothered with many families of children and servants in one house
or small tenement,” raising concerns about adequate food supplies and
transmission of plague.84 This heritage of land use control came to the
colonies with the English settlers and included measures designed to
require the development of property and discourage leaving it in the
natural state.85 In urban areas, colonial governments were concerned
about undue density.86
Today, land use regulation—and particularly zoning87—is a core
function of local government, in accordance with the authority granted

80. E.g., Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 1, at 18-22 (history of land use
law focused on addressing the challenges of urban growth).
81. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
83. See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
84. David L. Callies et al., Cases and Materials on Land Use 2-3 n.** (5th ed.
2008) (quoting 31 Eliz. I C. 7 (6 Stat. 409 et seq.)).
85. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1252, 1259-72, 1276-80 (1996).
86. Id. at 1273-74.
87. The standard land use regulatory tools include zoning, planning, subdivision review, and financing infrastructure; these are the core elements found in any treatise on
the subject. See, e.g., Mandelker, supra note 1, at 3.01.
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to it by the relevant state.88 The concept of zoning began to take hold
early in the twentieth century, culminating in the drafting of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) by the United States Department of
Commerce in 1924.89 Section 1 of the SZEA identified the regulation
of both population density and building intensity as key elements of the
zoning power.90 Section 3 of the SZEA makes clear that the purposes
of zoning include reducing traffic congestion, and preventing the “overcrowding of land” and “undue concentration of population.”91
To some extent these provisions reflect the origin of the SZEA, which
was based on the zoning law developed for New York City (hence the
concern with congestion and “adequate light and air”),92 but they go far
beyond a concern with overcrowding to express a concern more generally with “health and the general welfare.”93
These two sections together comprise the key elements of the SZEA,
offering local governments a specific regulatory tool—the power to
zone—with relatively broad permission to exercise their discretion in
the public interest. Thus the zoning power is delegated to local governments as a specific tool by which to exercise the police power: the
traditional power of governments to protect their citizens’ health, safety
and general welfare. This police power is an inherent power of the state
legislature that it delegates to local government, and the scope of the
zoning power thus depends upon the scope of the police power under
state law.94

88. In the United States, all local government powers derive from the state. Thus any
local government activity must be authorized by the state constitution or state legislature, or must be reasonably necessary to achieve that authorized activity. See Hunter v.
City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); e.g., Barlow Burke, Understanding
the Law of Zoning and Land Use Controls 6-7 (2d ed. 2009).
89. See Advisory Committee on Zoning, A Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act (rev. ed. 1928), available at http://myapa.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZ
EnablingAct1926.pdf. This legislation was adopted in some form by virtually all states
in the United States, so that although zoning is a matter of state and local law its form
is very similar nationwide. Mandelker, supra note 1, at 4.15.
90. Specifically, section 1 identified the following grants of power:
To regulate and restrict the height, number of stories, and size of buildings and
other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts
and other open spaces, the density of population, the location and use of buildings,
structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 1, reprinted in Mandelker, supra note 1, at
4.16.
91. Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 3, reprinted in Mandelker, supra note 1,
at 4.16.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Burke, supra note 88, at 3-5 (explaining the origin and scope of the police
power and its role in local land use authority).
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The constitutionality of zoning was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.95 in 1926. The Village of Euclid
was, at the time, an existing village near rapidly-growing Cleveland,
Ohio. In the absence of municipal borders or zoning, it was likely that
most, if not all of the land owned by Ambler Realty in Euclid would
be developed for industry.96 “The Village of Euclid decided, however,
that it wanted to determine the land uses within its boundaries. It adopted zoning for the entire village and in so doing zoned a portion of
Ambler’s land for residential use.97 Ambler raised a facial challenge to
the very concept of zoning, asserting that the village could not justify
its disruption of the natural forces of the market. The Supreme Court
rejected Ambler’s challenge and in so doing established several points
of essential importance to the development of land use law, the following of which are pertinent here.
First, the Euclid decision endorsed the concept of zoning. That is, the
Supreme Court agreed that a local government constitutionally could
decide what land uses would be permitted within its borders by means
of defining those uses and identifying their permissible locations on a
map. In that effort, the village could exercise its own judgment on behalf of the health, safety and welfare of its residents; it did not need to
consider the uses in neighboring Cleveland.98
Second, the Euclid decision endorsed a principle of deferential review of local land use legislative decisions. The process of adopting
a zoning ordinance and map is a legislative decision by the legislative
body of a municipal government. Key words in the decision are now familiar in judicial review of land use legislative decisions: “If the validity
of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable,
the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.”99
Third, Euclid tells us that a zoning restriction can be valid even if
it reduces the value of an individual parcel of land. Ambler asserted
that his land had lost seventy-five percent of its value through the restrictive zoning;100 the Court did not find this to be a legal flaw. The
opinion offers no suggestion that Ambler deserves to be compensated
for the reduction in value of his property (in part because the Court

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
See id. at 384.
Id. at 379-80, 382.
Id. at 389-90.
Id. at 388.
See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384.
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handled this case as a facial attack to the zoning ordinance itself,101
not as a challenge to the effect of the zoning as applied to Ambler’s
land).102
After Euclid, the concept of zoning was protected from federal constitutional attack and the practice of zoning spread nationwide. Also
over the years, the scope and detail of land use regulation expanded to
include mandates for planning (based to some extent on the Standard
City Planning Enabling Act drafted in 1928),103 detailed controls over
the construction of subdivisions (also based in part on the Standard City
Planning Enabling Act of 1928),104 and an array of other land use regulatory tools. Use of each of these tools was predominantly focused on
ensuring that development of land takes place in a manner that protects
the public interest. Cities channel growth, limit density, and dictate aesthetic features of what is developed; in general, communities expect that
growth will happen and that it is their goal to manage it.
B. Growth Management Innovations
Although much of the land use regulatory system is about eighty-yearsold, it has proven to be both durable and adaptable, as municipalities
use the regulatory tools at their disposal to address emerging issues of
the day. The history of growth management regulation provides a pertinent example. From its inception, zoning was used to shape the land use
structure of a municipality, but it was not designed to affect or constrain
the pace of development. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, municipalities in rapidly-growing areas of the nation became concerned that their
populations were growing too quickly for their tastes, threatening their
ability to provide adequate public services and maintain an acceptable
quality of life for their residents. Two of these municipalities in particular undertook to devise regulatory mechanisms to control growth,
prompting litigation that resulted in two important decisions: Golden v.

101. Id. at 386.
102. The Court specifically noted that, in a particular instance, a zoning designation
might be unconstitutional as applied to a particular parcel of land, 272 U.S. at 395, and
a few years later it found such an instance of unconstitutionality in Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
103. See Burke, supra note 88, at 76.
104. Mandelker observes: “States first enacted subdivision control legislation towards the close of the nineteenth century to remedy land conveyancing problems. . . .
The Standard City Planning Enabling Act used these early subdivision platting statutes
as a model for subdivision control enabling legislation which was included in the Act.”
Mandelker, supra note 1, at 9.02.
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Planning Board of Ramapo105 and Construction Industry Ass’n v. City
of Petaluma.106
The most significant of these for present purposes was the Ramapo
decision.107 In 1969, the Ramapo town board—concerned about rapid
growth—amended its zoning ordinance to make ingenious use of the
town’s existing powers of planning, zoning and subdivision regulation.
The town prepared a comprehensive plan to determine what infrastructure
it would need to accommodate future growth, how much the infrastructure would cost, and how it could all be built.108 Then, on the basis of this
information, Ramapo prepared a mechanism for phased development.
The town decided that construction of a residential subdivision on
undeveloped land would be considered a “residential development use”
for which a special use permit would be required.109 The town adopted
requirements for the special use permit, based on the availability of necessary infrastructure. The use permit would not be granted until critical
infrastructure was available: sewers, drainage, parks and schools, roads,
and fire stations.110 Under the town’s capital improvement schedule, this
could mean a wait of up to eighteen years.111

105. Golden v. Planning Bd., 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
106. Constr. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 934 (1975).
107. Ramapo is a town near New York City. Between 1950 and 1968, Ramapo’s
population grew by nearly 300%, and it looked like the trend would continue, involving
substantial amounts of residential construction. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 294 n.1; John R.
Nolon, Golden and Its Emanations: The Surprising Origins of Smart Growth, 35 Urb.
Law 15, 18 (2003).
108. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 294-95 n.1, 366-67.
109. Id. at 295.
110.
The standards for the issuance of special permits are framed in terms of the availability to the proposed subdivision plat of five essential facilities or services: specifically (1) public sanitary sewers or approved substitutes; (2) drainage facilities;
(3) improved public parks or recreation facilities, including public schools; (4) State,
county or town roads-major, secondary or collector; and, (5) firehouses. No special
permit shall issue unless the proposed residential development has accumulated 15
development points, to be computed on a sliding scale of values assigned to the specified improvements under the statute. Subdivision is thus a function of immediate
availability to the proposed plat of certain municipal improvements; the avowed purpose of the amendments being to phase residential development to the Town’s ability
to provide the above facilities or services.
Id. at 295.
111. A developer could advance the date of development by providing the infrastructure itself, in order to achieve the necessary number of “development points.”
A landowner also could build a residence on residential land that was not subdivided.
Id. The town included some other flexibility measures as well.
Certain savings and remedial provisions are designed to relieve of potentially unreasonable restrictions. Thus, the board may issue special permits vesting a present
right to proceed with residential development in such year as the development meets
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Although the town’s growth management program used only its traditional tools of planning, zoning, and subdivision review, the purpose
to which these tools were put and the precise details of the program
were path-breaking. “The planning literature of the time was full of
excitement about growth management, but there was little evidence, on
the ground, of its legal adoption.”112
The plaintiffs charged that Ramapo’s program was not authorized
by the state enabling legislation. And that was a reasonable challenge:
zoning authority, of which the special use permit is a part, is designed to
shape development, not to slow it down. This issue had not previously
been litigated.113 The New York Court of Appeals agreed that there was
no specific authority for this type of timing control in the zoning law.114
Zoning had not traditionally concerned itself with timing.
But the court looked beyond the zoning power to “the perimeters of
the devices authorized and purposes sanctioned under current enabling
legislation.”115 The state conferred the zoning power in order to protect
the public interest; this power “includes . . . by way of necessary implication, the authority to direct the growth of population for the purposes
indicated, within the confines of the township.”116 This is “a necessary
concomitant to the municipalities’ recognized authority to determine
the lines along which local development shall proceed, though it may
divert it from its natural course.”117 This decision reflects a very flexible
view of state authorization. The court did not parse particular language
in the state legislation delegating the zoning and subdivision powers. It

the required point minimum, but in no event later than the final year of the 18-year
capital plan. The approved special use permit is fully assignable, and improvements
scheduled for completion within one year from the date of an application are to be
credited as though existing on the date of the application. A prospective developer
may advance the date of subdivision approval by agreeing to provide those improvements which will bring the proposed plat within the number of development points
required by the amendments. And applications are authorized to the “Development
Easement Acquisition Commission” for a reduction of the assessed valuation. Finally, upon application to the Town Board, the development point requirements may
be varied should the board determine that such a variance or modification is consistent with the on-going development plan.
Id. at 296-99.
112. Nolan, supra note 107, at 19.
113. Id. at 18.
114. Golden, 285 N.E.2d at 296 (“A reading of the relevant statutory provisions
reveals that there is no specific authorization for the ‘sequential’ and ‘timing’ controls
adopted here.”).
115. Id. at 296.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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looked more broadly at the purpose of land use regulation. This, plus
the court’s highly deferential approach to the town’s planning efforts
and reliance on the town’s good faith in carrying out its plan,118 paved
the way for a decision in the town’s favor.119
The Ramapo decision has been hailed as one of the foundations of
the smart growth movement and other inventive uses of the land use
system. Professor Nolon notes, for example, that the court’s “broad interpretation of local land use authority has become a clear trend among
courts nationally and has fueled a great expansion of local invention to
deal with the problems of sprawl, the provision of infrastructure, the
costs of development, and, recently, the protection of natural resources
and the environment.”120 As a matter of doctrine, “the New York Court
of Appeals held that the state legislature had delegated vast implied
powers to municipalities to time growth, to achieve the most appropriate use of the land, and to invent the mechanisms for doing so.”121
Professor Nolon praises both the town and the case as follows: “The
Town of Ramapo blazed a bright trail of invention in the late 1960s. The
Ramapo court sustained the town’s power to do so and, for thirty years,
local governments have been ever bolder in developing smart growth
solutions to their unique land use problems.”122

118. “[I]n passing of the validity of the ordinance on its face, we must assume not
only the Town’s good faith, but its assiduous adherence to the program’s scheduled
implementation.” Id. at 373 n.7.
119. The opinion also addressed other important issues the plaintiffs raised. The
court concluded that the town’s plan left landowners with sufficient promise of future
development that the law did not constitute a regulatory taking. Id. at 380-81. The court
expressed concern about the exclusionary nature of the scheme: by definition, some
people who wanted to live in Ramapo could not. But the court concluded that this was
a necessary component of a timed growth structure based on a comprehensive plan. It
had a valid police power justification. Although regional measures might be better, the
issue in this case was simply whether the town had the authority to take the steps it did,
and the court concluded that the authority was there. Id. at 376.
120. Nolon, supra note 107, at 24.
121. Id. at 25.
122. Id. at 62. In the last decade, the planning community headlines have been dominated by the concepts of “smart growth” and “new urbanism.” While earlier growth
control efforts focused on controlling the rate of growth and ensuring adequate infrastructure to serve it, the Smart Growth movement advocated rethinking the forms of
growth, focusing on adopting a metropolitan-area-wide vision and reducing residential
sprawl. Smart growth involves integrating considerations of land use, housing, employment, transportation, and the environment, with a focus on long-term sustainable
development. New urbanism, in particular, focuses on encouraging denser, pedestrianfriendly neighborhoods with a greater emphasis on mass transportation. In 2002, the
American Planning Association released its mammoth Growing Smart Legislative
Guidebook, a comprehensive guide with model statutes for states to use to revamp
their land use enabling legislation. Meck, supra note 1. But the key to this movement,
as always, is that it assumes that growth will happen; it is intend to foster the type of
growth that seems desirable.
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Like Ramapo, the Petaluma case, Construction Industry Ass’n of
Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, is significant for its endorsement
of the breadth of a municipality’s discretion to control growth under the
police power. Like Ramapo, Petaluma was and is a suburb of a growing
city, in its case, San Francisco. Between 1964 and 1971, the community’s population began to grow so rapidly that the city became concerned.123 The response to the problem was the “Petaluma Plan,” based
on extensive research about housing patterns and trends.124 The plan
focused on controlling the tempo of growth and limiting the outward
expansion of the city.125
The Petaluma plaintiffs took their complaint to federal court, rather
than state court, so they necessarily raised federal issues, all of them
constitutional in nature. In particular, they argued that the plan was “exclusionary,” in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.126
The Ninth Circuit agreed that any restriction on construction of new
houses would exclude somebody, but that the restriction need only survive rational basis scrutiny: it would survive constitutional challenge if
it was rationally related to a legitimate public interest.127 And the court
cited a series of Supreme Court decisions endorsing a broad interpretation of the powers of local government in land use regulation.128 For example, in Berman v. Parker129 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to
a sweeping urban renewal program in the District of Columbia, stating:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power
of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as
healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.130

In light of this Supreme Court precedent and under the facts before
it, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Petaluma had adequately demonstrated that its regulation was a rational response to legitimate concerns
about the effects of growth. “We conclude therefore that . . . the concept
of the public welfare is sufficiently broad to uphold Petaluma’s desire

123. Constr. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
124. Id. at 901.
125. The Plan capped residential development at 500 dwelling units per year, when
constructed in units of five residences or more. The Plan included a greenbelt around
the city as a boundary for urban expansion and outlined procedures and criteria for
award of the annual 500 development-unit permits. See id.
126. See id. at 906-07.
127. See id.
128. See Constr. Indus. Ass’n, 522 F.2d. at 906-07.
129. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
130. Id. at 33.

246

The Urban Lawyer

Vol. 42, No. 2

Spring 2010

to preserve its small town character, its open spaces and low density of
population, and to grow at an orderly and deliberate pace.”131
The Petaluma decision is based on federal law and gives us no direct insights into the permissible parameters of the zoning power under
state law, but it does parallel Ramapo with its broad and generous view
of the scope of the police power, showing that this view pervades the
law at both the federal and the state level. The Ramapo and Petaluma
decisions together demonstrate a flexible interpretation of the range of
interests local governments may seek to protect, and they have been
influential in legitimizing growth management programs.132
C. The Message for Shrinking Cities
This brief history of the court treatment of growth control plans illustrates two points: first, the land use regulatory system historically has
been focused on fostering and guiding growth and development; and
second, that the existing land use regulatory system provides flexible
tools for regulators. Ramapo in particular offers a model: the town of
Ramapo identified a problem, researched its parameters, and used the
regulatory tools at its disposal in a creative manner to fashion a response. The town’s decision to slow the rate of growth, the court tells
us, was valid under state law; it was not a “taking” nor was it unduly
exclusionary under the circumstances.
Deference as established in Euclid and endorsed by state and federal
decisions thereafter means that cities can choose their own view of how
to regulate in the public interest, and they can use the regulatory tools
they have to implement that view. Thus while the shrinking cities movement represents a sharp change in direction, the land use regulatory
system is flexible enough to allow the shift.
Of particular importance here, perhaps, is the Supreme Court’s language in Berman v. Parker: the “concept of the public welfare is broad
and inclusive.”133 Berman upheld an ambitious urban renewal program
that required razing an entire blighted neighborhood, even though the
plaintiff’s property was itself not blighted. The general power to regulate in the public interest justified this sweeping approach. The Court
also noted the threat to the public interest of a decaying urban environment: “Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more
than spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate

131. Constr. Indus. Ass’n, 522 F.2d at 908-09.
132. See Daniel P. Selmi, et al., Land Use Regulation: Cases and Materials
550 (3d ed. 2008).
133. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
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the spirit . . . [and also] may despoil a community as an open sewer may
ruin a river.”134 The Supreme Court’s views have carried over to state
courts, which have upheld a municipality’s ability to determine what
the public interest requires in a particular instance.135 Thus if a city decides that its interest lies in shrinking, not growing, and in “greening,”
not building, there is ample precedent to suggest that its decision is well
within its authority under the police power.
III. Challenges for the Shrinking City

Underlying the shrinking cities movement is a central insight: there is
more land within some cities’ boundaries than current populations can
use. Excess houses fall vacant and deteriorate; a surplus of vacant houses
on the market sends a message of decay and drives down prices. For the
foreseeable future, Re-Imagining offers the view that the best way to
handle both problems is to take land out of the development market and
put it into alternative, productive “green” uses. As a practical matter,
this might require rezoning land from its current category (residential,
commercial, or industrial) into another development-restricted use. As
noted earlier, Cleveland already has a zoning category for urban gardens.136 Such downzoning raises the perennial issue of the regulatory
taking, which is the major focus of this section. This section also briefly
addresses some affiliated land use law objections to downzoning urban
property and, on a different note, the mismatch between federal and
state brownfields programs and the needs of a shrinking city.137
A. The Regulatory Takings Challenge
In spite of its stated enthusiasm for low-intensity green uses, the Cleveland City Planning Commission is wary of taking any action that might

134. Id.
135. See, e.g., Jaylin Inv., Inc. v. Vill. of Moreland Hills, 839 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio
2005) (holding that exercise of zoning powers is presumed to be within a municipality’s
police power unless it is arbitrary). This trend was visible even at the time of Euclid,
which cited a “constantly increasing tendency in the direction of the broader view” of
the power to zone in the public interest. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 390-91 (1926).
136. Urban gardens are discussed below. Cleveland recently adopted regulations for
keeping bees, chickens, rabbits and other farm animals within city limits, Cleveland,
Ohio, Codified Ordinances tit. VII, ch. 347.02 (2009), as well as zoning requirements for wind turbines. ch. 354A.
137. An interesting policy issue also arises, though at this point it does not have
a distinctive legal parameter, and that is the relationship between the shrinking city
concept—as implemented in the City of Cleveland itself—and another modern trend:
an interest in regional governmental cooperation.
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give rise to a takings claim. The city’s planning director has posed the
issue squarely:
With respect to zoning private land in the Urban Garden District, we would typically
avoid private land unless the owner agrees to the zoning. . . .[If] a private owner
objects to the urban garden zoning, I believe that it would be difficult for the City
to justify using the Urban Garden zoning, because this action could be considered
a regulatory taking of the property by removing most of the opportunity for an economic return on the use of the property.138

The Re-Imagining proposal includes a significant emphasis on urban
gardens and ecologically-valuable green space; consequently the takings question deserves careful attention. In that regard, urban gardens
and urban agriculture pose issues distinct from preservation of green
space for ecological functions.
While property law always has allowed some restrictions on land
use139—mere ownership of a piece of land does not entitle a person to
do with it whatever he wants—at the same time the courts have recognized federal constitutional limits (and in many states additional state
constitutional limits)140 on the extent to which the government can constrain private land use without providing compensation.141 In theory, the
issue is not whether regulation is unlawful; it is whether the government
must pay for the interference it causes. In practical effect, however,
cash-strapped public entities will seek to avoid imposing restrictions
that carry with them the hefty price tags of litigation and possible compensation. Thus it is essential to determine whether downzoning private
urban property to an urban garden or urban agricultural designation
might constitute a taking.142
138. E-mail from Robert N. Brown, supra note 72.
139. E.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (“It
seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be
restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers.”); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
413 (1922) (“As long recognized some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation
and must yield to the police power.”); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171,
176 (1915)
Granting that it is not a nuisance per se, it is clearly within the police power of the
state to regulate the business, and . . . to declare that in particular circumstances and
in particular localities a livery stable shall be deemed a nuisance in fact and in law,
provided this power is not exerted arbitrarily, or with unjust discrimination.
Id.
140. This article focuses on federal issues alone.
141. For an interesting discussion of the meaning of private land ownership and how
it affects takings law, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Private Property: Correcting the Half Truths,
59 Plan. & Envtl L. 3 (2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1075702.
142. The takings case law is founded on the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution,
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, which tells us that private
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As early as 1922, the Supreme Court held that “[g]overnment hardly
could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law,”143
but “if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”144 We
must not forget that “a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than
the constitutional way of paying for the change.”145
The Court has made clear that applying these simple platitudes in a
particular instance is a highly fact-specific inquiry, but the leading cases
share an essential scenario: in each instance, governmental regulation
has narrowed the range of permissible uses of a landowner’s parcel and
the owner has challenged the restriction as a “taking.” Most recently, in
Lingle v. Chevron,146 the Court sought to rationalize its somewhat confusing case law and map the proper Fifth Amendment analysis. In two
instances, the Court noted, regulatory action is a per se taking for Fifth
Amendment purposes. First, “where government requires an owner to
suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property—however minor—
it must provide just compensation.”147 Second, a taking occurs in the
case of “regulations that completely deprive an owner of ‘all economically beneficial use’ of her property.”148 If we assume that urban gardens
are a desirable goal that the city seeks to promote through zoning, the
question for consideration is whether a city like Cleveland lawfully may
rezone untenanted privately-held land as an urban garden district. We
consider private land, because the city may do what it wishes with land
owned by the land bank or otherwise by the city. We assume that the
land currently has no tenant to avoid the complication of the nonconforming use doctrine, which would protect the owner of an improved
parcel in active use from immediate application of the urban garden designation.149 Thus, for example, if the city rezones a parcel that contains
an occupied and viable private home, the nonconforming use doctrine
would protect continued use of that property as a residence.150

property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation being paid. U.S.
Const. amend. V.
143. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
144. Id. at 415.
145. Id. at 416.
146. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
147. Id. at 538.
148. Id.
149. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 1, at 118 (“zoning ordinances almost
universally permit nonconforming uses to continue”).
150. Cleveland, Ohio, Codified Ordinances tit. VII, ch. 359 (2009).
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The question is whether the city could successfully defend such a
rezoning, or downzoning, to urban agriculture against a takings challenge.151 The viability of such rezoning is likely to be tested soon, as
the implementation of the Re-Imagining report includes a study—just
beginning—to map specific locations in Cleveland that are suitable
for green uses, and a study of economic opportunities associated with
building a more robust local food economy.152
1. PER SE TAKINGS

Does an urban garden designation amount to a Lucas-style total taking?
In Lucas, the Supreme Court held that a taking occurs when a regulation “denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”153
In particular, the Court noted that South Carolina’s restriction on Lucas’s property required the land “to be left substantially in its natural
state. . . .”154
There is an argument that an urban garden designation is a per se
taking. The restriction imposed on Lucas prevented him from building a habitable structure; it did not prevent all use of the land. For example, he could build small or non-permanent structures. Consistent
with the state’s restrictions, it appears that if Lucas wanted to start a
market garden and sell vegetables to his neighbors on the Isle of Palms
he could have done so. Indeed, at the trial on Lucas’s claim, the Coastal
Council’s permit administrator testified that the state would allow construction of temporary structures and recreational or other uses of the
property.155 Nonetheless, Lucas was deemed to have suffered a total taking. Consistent with this view of Lucas, zoning for urban garden uses
is a per se taking.
A more compelling reading of the case, however, is that Lucas does
not apply to the urban garden. The Court’s decision turns on the trial
151. The city’s policy would avoid litigation with an existing private land owner
but it does not prevent any litigation at any point in the future. A subsequent purchaser
of land zoned for urban gardens still could raise a takings challenge. See Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). For an interesting discussion of whether the ripeness
of the claim affects its transferability see, Gregory M. Stein, Takings in the Twenty-First
Century: Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations After Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra,
69 Tenn. L. Rev. 891 (2002).
152. See Marc Lefkowitz, Rally for Rail and Big Boost to Regenerating Vacant Land
in Cleveland, Green City Blue Lake (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.gcbl.org/blog/marclefkowitz/rally-rail-and-big-boost-reimagining-land-use-20 (announcing a grant from
the Cleveland Foundation for these purposes).
153. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
154. Id. at 1018.
155. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 12-13, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992) (No. 91-453), 1991 WL 626699 (citing trial transcript).
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court’s finding that the land was “valueless.”156 The Court interpreted
this to mean that Lucas had suffered a deprivation of “all economically beneficial uses.”157 At the original trial on his case, Lucas argued
that because he could not build a single-family home the lots had no
value.158 The trial court agreed that the state’s law “worked a permanent
and total loss in the value of Lucas’s property.”159 This factual finding
was not reviewed at any stage in the appellate process,160 and it was
an uncontested premise of the petition for certiorari.161 The majority
opinion seems to assume that the state’s restriction required Lucas’s
land to be “left substantially in its natural state,”162 by which the majority presumably meant his inability to build a permanent structure. Although Justice Blackmun in dissent asserted that the trial court’s finding
was “implausible”163 and “almost certainly erroneous,”164 the majority
declined to enter into this debate. The Court made clear that “we decide the question presented under the same factual assumptions as did
the Supreme Court of South Carolina.”165 In subsequent decisions, the
Court has made clear that the distinctive feature of Lucas was that the
state’s restriction deprived Lucas of all economically beneficial use of
his property, rendering the property without value.166
The Lucas opinion therefore does not tell us what type of restriction
qualifies as a total taking. The Supreme Court did not evaluate or endorse
the trial court’s finding; it simply accepted the finding on its face and
proceeded from the assumption that the property had no economic value.

156. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
157. Id. at 1019.
158. Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 155, at 12-13 (citing trial transcript).
159. Id. at 8 (citing trial court decision).
160. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 85, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992) (No. 91-453), 1992 WL 672613. The issue before the South Carolina
Court of Appeals was whether the character of the government’s action (the prevention
of harm due to beach erosion) should be a factor in the taking analysis. See Lucas, 404
S.E.2d at 896, 901.
161. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022 n.9.
162. Id. at 1018.
163. Id. at 1037 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 1044.
165. Id. at 1022 n.9 (majority opinion).
166. E.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, Inc., 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002)
(Lucas is reserved for an “extraordinary circumstance”). There is some room for question
concerning whether the pertinent factor is a loss of all beneficial use or a loss of all economic value; language in the Tahoe-Sierra opinion uses both phrases. See Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 330 (“valueless” and deprivation of all “beneficial use”).
This is not important to resolve in the present context, where the city will argue that a
viable use remains—urban gardening—and thus the property has not lost all value.

252

The Urban Lawyer

Vol. 42, No. 2

Spring 2010

If a party can argue, as a factual matter, that property zoned for urban
gardens retains some residual economic value, Lucas does not apply.167
Although there appears to be no case law on urban garden zoning,
there are state and lower federal court cases concerning the preservation
of agricultural uses through agricultural zoning,168 a restriction that is
arguably comparable. Agricultural zoning can take a variety of forms
but in general it restricts permissible uses of the property to agriculture.
Some agricultural zones allow only agriculture, including only compatible buildings such as barns; others take the form of large lot zoning,
allowing agricultural uses and a maximum of one house on a large lot
(possibly anywhere from 10 to 160 acres).169 Other agricultural zones
are more generous, allowing some other uses such as stables or day
nurseries.170 Agricultural zoning is used in some states where the pressures of urbanization are viewed as a threat to local farming.171
Agricultural zoning challenges can concern either refusal to rezone
agricultural land or downzoning land from another use. A person might
buy land zoned for agricultural use and ask that it be rezoned for a
more intensive use, perhaps residences or industry. If the local zoning
authorities refuse to rezone, the owner might file suit alleging a range
of legal flaws with this decision. An alternative scenario would involve
land that was zoned for residential or other use that is downzoned to a
more restrictive category of agricultural use only, giving rise to a challenge by the landowner.
In either setting, the plaintiff-land owner has an uphill fight. As a
legislative enactment, the zoning ordinance is entitled to a presumption of validity; the plaintiff must show that it is unlawful.172 In the vast
majority of such cases, plaintiffs who allege that agricultural zoning

167. Some lower court decisions under very similar facts have declined to find a
Lucas taking. E.g., Gove v. Zoning Bd., 831 N.E.2d 865 (Mass. 2005); see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (holding state restriction on filling coastal
wetlands is not a Lucas taking where a portion of the property may be developed).
168. See infra notes 174, 177, 185, 191, 194, and accompanying text.
169. See Mark W. Cordes, Takings, Fairness and Farmland Preservation, 60 Ohio
St. L.J. 1033, 1048 (1999); e.g., Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir.
1988) (one residence allowed on sixty acres).
170. See, e.g., Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 165
(9th Cir. 1993) (“agriculture, agricultural buildings, garages, parking areas, stables,
roadside stands, day nurseries, and day care centers”).
171. Cordes, supra note 169, at 1033-34; see, e.g., Harvard State Bank v. County of
McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (agricultural zoning defended as
a buffer against suburban encroachment).
172. In most states zoning decisions are considered legislative, though in a few states
the rezoning of individual parcels is considered a quasi-judicial action. E.g., Fasano v.
Bd. of County Comm’rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973).
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is a taking have been unsuccessful, even when the property is downzoned from another category allowing greater development.173 In Pace
Resources, Inc. v. Shrewsbury Township,174 for example, the township
downzoned the plaintiff’s property from industrial to agricultural use,
largely because of concerns that the water supply was inadequate for
industry. Neither the Pennsylvania courts nor the federal court in which
the plaintiff sought relief held that the rezoning was a taking; both noted
the existence of residual value. As will be discussed below, the few contrary instances generally concern cases in which the land is unsuitable
for agriculture, so that it has no value as zoned.175
Our discussion at this point must broaden from Lucas to acknowledge the influence of another element in the agricultural zoning cases.
In many of these cases, two issues blend together: the owner challenges
the decision as invalid as a matter of zoning law because it is arbitrary
and not rationally related to a legitimate state interest; the owner might
also allege that the refusal to rezone (or the downzoning) is a taking.
The first of these may be couched either as a matter of state law (the
zoning does not comply with the zoning statute because it is arbitrary)
or as a constitutional substantive due process challenge.176 Before the
173. See Cordes, supra note 169, at 1069.
In sum, lower courts have generally affirmed the constitutional validity of agricultural
zoning, and in particular that it should not pose a takings problem if done pursuant to
sound planning. . . . [T]he decisions largely affirm and are consistent with Supreme
Court takings jurisprudence. In particular, lower courts have consistently rejected
takings challenges as long as the property was economically viable as farmland, even
when there was a substantial diminution in property value.
Id.; see also Mark W. Cordes, Fairness and Farmland Preservation: A Response to
Professor Richardson, 20 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 371, 376 (2005) (making the
same points but with reference to more recently decided Supreme Court cases); Jesse J.
Richardson, Downzoning, Fairness and Farmland Protection, 19 J. Land Use &
Envtl. L. 59 (2003) (concluding that downzoning is not likely to be unconstitutional
but it is unfair).
174. Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023 (3d Cir. 1987). The federal
court specifically noted that the downzoning reduced the land from an alleged value of
$495,000 to $52,000, but concluded that “although Pace may have been denied the best
use . . . of its 37 acres, it has not been deprived of all economically viable uses of the
property.” Id. at 1031.
175. Cordes, supra note 169, at 1060. Other cases have upheld agricultural zoning.
E.g., Forner v. Allendale Charter Twp., No. 212531, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 2202,
at *23-*24 (Ct. App. May 26, 2000); Gardner v. New Jersey Pinelands Comm’n, 593
A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991); May v. Bd. of Trs., No. 18997, 2002 WL 1396008 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 28, 2002).
176. For example, in Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (Ct. App. 1974)
the court seemed to address the state law issue of whether zoning was non-arbitrary and
thus a valid exercise of the police power, but it used language reminiscent of Euclid:
The County, in the exercise of its sound discretion, impliedly determined that the
minimum 18-acre parcel size is necessary in aid of the preservation of the agricultural
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Supreme Court’s Lingle decision in 2005, the takings analysis was confused by a suggestion that the substantive due process and regulatory
takings analyses overlapped. In the 1980 decision Agins v. City of Tiburon177 the Court had observed that a taking occurs “if the ordinance does
not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner
economically viable use of the land.”178 The Lingle Court noted that
for many years courts had found a taking if either of these conditions
appeared, even though the first (the “substantially advances” portion)
was more properly designated a due process concern.179 As the Lingle
Court noted:
Instead of addressing a challenged regulation’s effect on private property, the “substantially advances” inquiry probes the regulation’s underlying validity. But such an
inquiry is logically prior to and distinct from the question whether a regulation effects
a taking, for the Takings Clause presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit
of a valid public purpose.180

Lingle separated due process from takings concerns for purposes of the
federal takings analysis. The second part of the Agins test, of course,
was adopted in Lucas: a regulation is a per se taking if it “denies an
owner viable use of the land.”181 Prior to Lingle, however, states such
as Ohio might consider both prongs of the Agins test in evaluating a
taking.182
Many state court decisions on agricultural zoning reflect both the substantive due process and the takings concerns, and sometimes blend the

character of the area, and since that is a question upon which reasonable minds might
differ, there should be no judicial interference with the legislative determination.
Id. at 921-22. In Wilson v. Trs., Union Twp., No. CA98-06-036, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS
5025 (Ct. App. 1998) the court made the dual nature of the argument clear: “The police
power of the government simply ‘does not extend to arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable’ actions. An ordinance which is enacted outside this permissible scope is unconstitutional because any ordinance that bears no relation to valid police power violates the
requirements of the due process of law.” Id. at *8 (citations omitted).
177. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
178. Id. at 260 (citations omitted).
179. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 541 (2005).
180. Id. at 543.
181. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
182. Prior to Lingle, the Ohio Supreme Court allowed a taking to be found if a regulation did not substantially advance a legitimate state purpose, without regard to whether
the property had lost value. E.g., State ex rel. Shemo v. City of Mayfield Heights, 765
N.E.2d 345 (Ohio 2002); Goldberg Cos., Inc. v. Richmond Heights. City Council, 690
N.E.2d 510 (Ohio 1998). After the Lingle decision, it appears that the Ohio courts will follow the Lingle Court’s lead. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Clark County
Bd. of Comm’rs, 875 N.E.2d 59 (Ohio 2007) (following Lingle). For cases relying on
Agins, see Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 165 (9th Cir.
1993) and Habersham at Northridge v. Fulton County, 632 F. Supp. 815, 821 (N.D. Ga.
1985). Both of these are federal cases so their use of a federal standard is not surprising.
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two.183 With regard to the substantive due process challenge, the government’s action usually is upheld; after all, the legislative action will
survive a challenge if its validity is “fairly debatable,”184 which means
that the plaintiff must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that it is
arbitrary. In Gisler v. County of Madera,185 for example, the California
court upheld “exclusive agricultural zoning with a minimum 18-acre
parcel size” on the ground that open space preservation is a valid public
purpose and the zoning of the subject parcel was not unreasonable.186
Municipal governments defend agricultural zoning by documenting
their plans or policies in favor of protecting agricultural uses, preventing the spread of uses incompatible with agriculture, and avoiding authorizing development in isolated locations.187
With regard to the takings question, with very few exceptions the
state cases use an Agins-type analysis for takings (sometimes citing
Agins itself ): they assert that agricultural zoning is a taking when it
“denies an owner economically viable use of the land.”188 Thus they appear to assume that the challenged zoning will survive if the record can
support a conclusion that some value remains. Courts uphold the zoning
when there is evidence that the land is suitable for farming or is actually being farmed,189 or when the plaintiff simply has not proven that he
183. E.g., Grand Land Co. v. Twp. Of Bethlehem, 483 A.2d 818, 820 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1984) (not a taking because zoned for a “reasonable use”). The combination
of the concepts is in full view in Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (Ct.
App. 1974), where the court observed that
[i]n certain factual situations it is difficult to draw a precise line between a noncompensable injury resulting from the enactment of a valid regulation under the police power and regulations which are beyond the limits of the police power and can
only be justified as a ‘taking’ under the power of eminent domain which requires just
compensation.
Id. at 921 (citations omitted).
184. This standard, derived from the Euclid case, traditionally is used by courts
reviewing legislative actions of local authorities. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra
note 1, at 330.
185. Gisler, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919.
186. See id. at 921-22.
187. E.g., Harvard State Bank v. County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993) (applying a multifactor test under state law); Racich v. County of Boone, 625
N.E.2d 1095 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Wilson v. County of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981); Forner v. Allendale Charter Twp., No. 212531, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS
2202 (Ct. App. May 26, 2000); Van Arsdel v. Twp. of Addison, 195 N.W.2d 21 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1972); Codorus Twp. v. Rodgers, 492 A.2d 73 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).
188. E.g., County of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1983) (applying Agins test
to find no taking because not all value taken by eighty acre minimum lot zoning); Eck v.
City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193, 197 (N.D. 1979), Wilson v. Trs., Union Twp., No.
CA98-06-036, 1998 Ohio App. Lexis 5025 (Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1998).
189. Grand Land Co. v. Bethlehem, 483 A.2d 818, 820 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1984) (zoning restriction invalid because beyond the powers granted by state law, but
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cannot use the property as zoned.190 The owner might assert that farming is not profitable or does not produce enough revenue to cover taxes.
This argument was advanced in Wilson v. County of McHenry,191 but
the court observed that the county had presented testimony that better
farming practices could make the land productive.192 The case upheld
agricultural zoning with a 160-acre minimum lot size.193
Cases that find agricultural zoning to be a taking generally focus on
the unsuitability of the land for farming. Thus, two cases found that
the agricultural zoning category was not valid because it is being used
simply as a holding zone, not as an actual source of agricultural productivity. In Petersen v. City of Decorah,194 the plaintiff’s land was zoned
for agriculture even though it had not been farmed for over thirty years;
the city admitted that it was using the agricultural classification as a
holding zone, waiting for the right type of industrial use to come along.
The Iowa court held that this was “unreasonable and confiscatory.”195
In Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake196 the Wisconsin court found that the
plaintiff’s land had “a substantial negative value” as farmland; use of
agricultural zoning as a “holding district” to control future development
was “unreasonable” and unconstitutional on due process grounds.197
Two other cases, both in Illinois, applied that state’s multifactor test
to conclude that agricultural zoning of particular property was arbitrary
as a matter of state law. Smeja v. County of Boone concerned 50 acres

not a taking because agriculture is a “reasonable use” and “not economically infeasible”); Vanderburgh County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Rittenhouse, 575 N.E.2d 663 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1991) (plaintiffs failed to show the property “cannot be reasonably be used under
the present zoning classification,” testimony showed the land was farmable, taking argument rejected); Bell River Assocs. v. China Charter Twp, 565 N.W.2d 695, 699-700
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Mays v. Bd. of Trs., No. 18997, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 3347
at *24-*25 (Ct. App. June 28, 2002); Joyce v. City of Portland, 546 P.2d 1100 (Or. Ct.
App. 1976).
190. Forner v. Allendale Charter Twp., No. 212531, 2000 Mich. App. LEXIS 2202
(Ct. App. May 26, 2000); Wilson v. Trs., Union Twp., No. CA98-06-036, 1998 Ohio
App. LEXIS 5025 (Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1998); Smythe v. Butler Twp., 620 N.E. 2d 901
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Murray v. Columbia River Gorge Comm’n, 865 P.2d 1319 (Or.
Ct. App. 1993); Chokecherry Hills Estate v. Deuel County, 294 N.W.2d 654 (S.D.
1980).
191. Wilson v. County of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
192. Id. at 429.
193. In Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988), the plaintiffs
alleged that the ranch cost as much or more in taxes as it produced in revenue, but the
court did not find a taking.
194. Petersen v. City of Decorah, 259 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977).
195. Id. at 555.
196. Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 211 N.W.2d 471, 477 (Wis. 1973).
197. Id. at 475-77.
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zoned for agriculture; the owner wanted it to be rezoned for residences.198
The trial court concluded that the agricultural zoning was “unconstitutional and invalid,” and the appellate court affirmed.199 Illinois courts
evaluate the validity of a zoning ordinance by taking into account factors
such as the uses and zoning of nearby properties, the extent to which the
existing zoning diminishes the property’s value, the suitability of the
property for the zoned purpose, and the relative gain to the public and
burden on the owner of the existing and the proposed zoning uses.200
The testimony in Smeja was that 15 acres of the tract were “submarginal land not particularly desirable for the raising of crops” and that
the remaining 35 acres were wooded.201 The appellate court’s decision
displays general skepticism about the value of agricultural zoning; in
particular the court saw little public benefit in maintaining such a tract
as agricultural.202 Similarly, in Pettee v. County of De Kalb,203 the plaintiff sought to rezone agricultural land to allow residences and a small
aircraft landing field. The trial court found that the agricultural zoning
was “arbitrary and unreasonable,” and the Illinois appellate court affirmed.204 One key finding was that the land was “largely unsuitable
for farming.”205 The appellate court also offered the view that although
“farmland might well be characterized as an essential natural resource,”
in the court’s view “the evidence fails to disclose why plaintiff’s land
specifically should be so preserved for the general benefit.”206
Finally, some cases conclude that the municipality’s action was irrational because of other failings. In Harris Bank of Hinsdale v. County
of Kendall,207 the Illinois appellate court agreed with a trial court’s finding that refusal to rezone agricultural land was arbitrary and unreasonable. There was no suggestion that the land was unsuitable for farming;
instead a significant factor was that the county’s own plan designated
the area for urbanization.208 In Twigg v. County of Will,209 the plaintiffs
wanted to subdivide their rural land to build residences for family mem-

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

See Smeja v. County of Boone, 339 N.E.2d 452 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
Id. at 456.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id. at 455.
Pettee v. County of De Kalb, 376 N.E.2d 720 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
Id.
Id. at 725.
Id.
Harris Bank v. County of Kendall, 625 N.E.2d 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
Id. at 851.
Twigg v. County of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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bers and others. Again there was no showing that the land could not be
used to grow crops; instead, a key finding was that “the evidence tended
to show that the current zoning of the area, including plaintiffs’ tract,
was assigned in an arbitrary manner without considering the several
non-conforming uses existing when the land-use plan was adopted and
the zoning ordinance was enacted.”210
In light of these cases, the City of Cleveland is likely to be able to
defend its agricultural zoning against a suggestion of a Lucas taking,
as well as a charge of arbitrariness. Cleveland has a lively and active
urban gardening and farming community, including a variety of farms
for profit, all of which are relatively small scale and focus on niche
or high-value produce.211 The viability of urban farming for profit was
specifically evaluated in a study in Philadelphia, which—although it
concerned a limited range of agriculture—concluded that profitable
urban farming is possible.212 Like any other business, it requires skilled
planning, production, and marketing, but it can be done.
Cleveland can build a record to support its contention that an Urban
Garden Designation was rationally selected for a particular piece of
land and has value for the owner of a particular parcel. The analogy
to agricultural zoning is clear in the case of a market garden, which is
agriculture on a small scale: the gardener sells crops for income. Thus
the use of a parcel of land for profitable urban farming, as part of an
overall plan of promoting urban gardens, is both rational and—under
these cases, which reach only the Lucas form of taking—not a taking.
First, the use of the Urban Garden Designation is a considered, planned
aspect of Cleveland’s zoning structure. Re-Imagining—which has been
adopted by the Cleveland Planning Commission—envisions a proliferation of urban gardens, raising them from isolated curiosities to a productive and commonplace element of city life.213 Second, Cleveland has

210. Id. at 746.
211. For further evidence of the vitality of the urban farming and garden community in Cleveland, see Mark Lefkowitz, Green City Blue Lake, Tour Nine Urban Farms
in Cleveland This Saturday (July 2, 2009) http://www.gcbl.org/blog/marc-lefkowitz/
tour-nine-urban-farms-cleveland-saturday, as well as Local Food Cleveland, http://
www.localfoodcleveland.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2010), Urban Growth, http://www.
urbangrowthfarms.com (last visited Mar. 10, 2010), and Cleveland-Cuyahoga County
Food Policy Coalition, http://www.cccfoodpolicy.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2010).
212. See Urban Partners, Farming in Philadelphia: Feasibility Analysis
and Next Steps 1-3 (2007), available at http://www.spinfarming.com/common/pdfs/
STF_inst_for_innovations_exec_summary_dec07.pdf.
213. See Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 28.
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identified a rational method by which to identify sites that are suitable
for community gardens, as illustrated in Re-Imagining.214 Assuming
that the city has an adequate factual basis for each rezoning decision,215
and recognizing that—on appropriate land—urban gardening can be
economically viable, a claim of a Lucas-style taking seems unlikely to
be successful. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the presence of
any residual economic value precludes the application of Lucas.216
The above argument relies heavily upon agricultural zoning cases, so
it is fair to ask whether rural agricultural zoning really is comparable to
an urban garden. Arguably there must be a difference between preserving agriculture at the edge of a city and promoting agriculture at the
heart of one. In the shrinking city context, however, we must recognize
the ambiguity of the terms “agriculture” and “city.” The term “agriculture” encompasses any form of cultivating the soil, producing crops, or
raising livestock; it is not restricted to industrial farming on hundreds
of acres. And a “city” in the case of places like Detroit and Cleveland is
urban without overall high density; the central problem of a shrinking
city is an excess of vacant or under-used land.
Of course there are differences in purpose. One common purpose of
agricultural zoning is to preserve farmland from urban encroachment;
the Urban Garden District, by contrast, seeks to return nominally urban
land to agricultural status. One key defense of agricultural zoning often
is the agricultural nature of the surrounding land. The Urban Garden
District is likely to be an isolated garden used in a city. In the words of
Euclid, we are putting the pig in the parlor, where some might think it
does not belong.217
These are distinctions between the two types of zones, without a
doubt, but they do not eliminate the essential value of the comparison.
In terms of rationality or substantive due process, the city’s rationale
for an urban garden, although different from the rationale for agri214. Id. at 9 fig.7.
215. If instead the designation is arbitrary, without adequate factual basis, it is vulnerable to challenge on that ground without the need to show a taking. E.g., Jaylin Invs.,
Inc. v. Vill. of Moreland Hills, 839 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio 2006).
216. E.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, Inc., 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002). For
example, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, the state’s restrictions on filling coastal wetlands
precluded the plaintiff from building a proposed 74-lot subdivision. Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001). The Court found no Lucas taking, because he still could
build a single house on an upland portion of the parcel. Id. As the Court pointed out,
“A regulation permitting a landowner to build a substantial residence on an 18-acre
parcel does not leave the property ‘economically idle.’ ” Id. at 632 (quoting Lucas).
217. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 391, 394-95 (1926).
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cultural zoning, can withstand scrutiny under the relaxed standard of
Euclid. The regulatory taking argument is the same in both instances:
that the restriction of the land to agricultural purposes is confiscatory;
and the response is the same: that agriculture is an economically beneficial use.
It should be noted that the Cleveland urban garden district also allows
community gardens, which do not directly produce income, and none
of the cases consider whether farming for one’s own consumption or
donation is a sufficient economically beneficial use to avoid the charge
of a taking. However, the takings analysis asks whether property can
be used as zoned, and the urban garden category allows both market
and community gardens. Consequently, as long as the site is zoned for
both market and community gardens and is suitable for gardening, the
agricultural zoning cases can assist Cleveland in defending its zoning
category against a charge of a Lucas taking. The takings issue would be
much more difficult if the zoning allowed nonprofit community gardens
alone, and would raise interesting questions about the type of economically beneficial use that the Supreme Court would accept to defeat a
takings claim.218
2. TAKING UNDER PENN CENTRAL

If an urban garden district designation is not a per se taking under
Lucas, there remains the possibility that a court could hold that it is a
taking under the multi-factor analysis of Penn Central.219 In Penn Central, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the application of New
York City’s Landmarks Law to Grand Central Station, where New York
had denied Penn Central permission to build a modern office tower on
top of the existing, classically elegant terminal building.220
The Penn Central decision instructed us to consider the economic
impact of the regulation on the landowner, and in particular the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations, and the “character of the government action.”221 In applying
these factors, the Court recently explained in Lingle, we evaluate “the

218. In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Supreme Court famously recognized that cultivation of wheat on one’s own property for one’s own consumption
nonetheless was sufficiently related to interstate commerce to implicate the Commerce
Clause. This holding recently was upheld in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (cultivation and use of marijuana for medical purposes). Perhaps these cases provide a starting point for an argument that even a community garden is an economic use.
219. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
220. Id.
221. The Penn Central list of factors is discussed in Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-39.
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severity of the burden that government imposes upon private property
rights.”222 Our goal is to “identify regulatory actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking in which government directly appropriates private property or ousts the owner from his domain.”223 In
the Penn Central context, we consider “the magnitude of a regulation’s
economic impact and the degree to which it interferes with legitimate
property interests.”224
The Penn Central/Lingle test is more easily stated than applied. What
does it mean to conclude that a regulatory restriction is “functionally
equivalent” to a classic taking? When the government seizes property
by eminent domain it ousts the landowner from the property and acquires title itself. Thus the landowner loses all of the attributes of ownership: he loses title to the property and thus cannot possess it, exclude
others from it, use the property, or sell it to somebody else.
It is unclear how any restriction that does not essentially eradicate
one or more of the attributes of ownership would be functionally equivalent to eminent domain. By definition any regulation evaluated under
Penn Central has less effect on the owner than either a physical invasion (held to be a per se taking in Loretto v. Teleprompter)225 or the
Lucas setting. Indeed, the Penn Central analysis relatively seldom leads
a court to conclude that a taking has occurred.226
In addition, although the Penn Central Court identified three factors,
it offered no guidance concerning how they are to be weighed. Arguably it even eschewed offering guidance, by stating that takings analysis
involves “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries.”227 Some have questioned
whether the Penn Central Court applied its own test in the Penn Central
decision,228 so it is small wonder that many judicial decisions describe

222. Id. at 539.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 540.
225. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
226. See Walcek v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 248, 271-72 (2001); Cordes, supra
note 169, at 378.
227. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
228. After it outlined the principles governing its decision in the first few parts of the
opinion, the Court then states:
We now must consider whether the interference with appellant’s property is of such
a magnitude that ‘there must be an exercise of eminent domain. . . .’ That inquiry may
be narrowed to the question of the severity of the impact of the law on appellant’s
parcel, and its resolution in turn requires a careful assessment of the impact of the
regulation on the Terminal site.
Id. at 136.
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the factors, briefly explain how each is featured in the case before it, and
(usually) conclude that no taking has occurred.229 Nonetheless, we are
required to follow the instructions in Lingle and apply the Penn Central
analysis to the problem of the urban garden.
a. Economic Impact
The Penn Central decision introduced the issue of economic impact by
phrasing it as follows:
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court’s decision have
identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment backed expectations are of course relevant considerations. . . . So, too, is the character of the governmental action.230

In the Lingle decision, the Court repeated this language.231 The Penn
Central Court’s use of the words “several factors” and “relevant considerations” suggests that, with regard to economic effect, the Court
had two elements in mind: the “economic impact” as a whole, and the
impact on “investment-backed expectations” as part of that effect.232
Thus it has become customary to consider the extent to which the
restriction at issue reduces the value of the property: is it worth significantly less with the restriction than it would be if the restriction were
removed? For example, the economic impact of prohibiting filling a wetland might be less than the economic impact of prohibiting construction
on comparably located dry land, because the cost of construction in a
wetland is much higher and thus the site is less desirable for building.233
At the same time, however, the Penn Central Court cautioned against
giving a significant loss in value too much weight:
Appellants concede that the decisions sustaining other land use regulations, which,
like the New York City [landmarks] law, are reasonably related to the promotion
of the general welfare, uniformly reject the proposition that diminution in property
value, standing alone, can establish a “taking” and that the “taking” issue in these
contexts is resolved by focusing on the uses the regulations permit.234

229. E.g., District Intown Props. Ltd. P’ship. v. District of Columbia, 198 F.3d 874
(D.C. Cir. 1999); Zanghi v. Bd. of Appeals, 807 N.E.2d 221 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). For
an example of a case concluding that a Penn Central taking has occurred, see Florida
Rock Indus. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 21 (1999).
230. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
231. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005).
232. See id.
233. E.g., Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Jul. 5, 2005) (disposition of case on remand from the Supreme Court, taking the cost of
construction in a marsh into account in evaluating economic impact).
234. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131.
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This language suggests that the more significant part of the inquiry concerns the interference with investment-backed expectations concerning
permissible or reasonable uses of the land.
Nonetheless, we must consider the extent to which an Urban Garden
designation is likely to diminish the value of the owner’s land. Here,
the question is whether rezoning vacant land from a residential, industrial, or commercial category to an urban garden zone would have a
significant effect on the land’s value. In the absence of a specific case,
we cannot know the precise answer to this question. The Re-Imagining
report suggests, however, that the city would not designate as urban
garden any land that has significant development potential.235 Moreover,
the assumption of the Re-Imagining model is that Cleveland has large
quantities of excess land that need to be brought into productive use,
and that an urban garden—as opposed to a vacant lot—is a productive
use. Indeed, the Cleveland zoning code envisions urban gardens as a
way of enhancing the city, by providing green space, a food resource,
and a community gathering place.236 This assumption perhaps challenges traditional understanding of an economically beneficial urban
use but, in the context of the shrinking city, has some appeal. Thus we
can conclude that the rezoning is unlikely to result in a significant diminution of value, bearing in mind that the assumption would be tested in
a particular case.237
b. Investment-Backed Expectations
The second element of the Penn Central analysis is “the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations.”238 The Court did not offer much explanation of what it
meant by this term, other than the following: “[T]his Court has dismissed
“taking” challenges on the ground that, while the challenged Government action caused economic harm, it did not interfere with interests
that were sufficiently bound up with the reasonable expectations of the
claimant to constitute “property” for Fifth Amendment purposes.”239
Taken at face value, this suggests that only an actual property interest

235. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 9.
236. See Cleveland, Ohio, Codified Ordinances, tit. VII, ch. 336.01 (2009).
237. If significant development pressures emerge at some point in the future, nothing
prevents the City—after an appropriate public hearing and consideration—from rezoning the land for a more intensive use. If it declines to rezone, the scenario becomes one
with which we are familiar: an owner of land zoned for a less intensive use seeks rezoning to a higher use; when permission is refused, the owner files suit, alleging a taking.
238. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
239. Id. at 124-25.
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qualifies as an investment-backed expectation. One example of such an
interest would be a vested right in development, which can arise under
common law when a property owner has committed sufficient resources
to construction in compliance with a valid permit,240 or by statute in
states that have adopted statutory criteria for vesting.241 A person with
a vested right to finish a project is protected from any change in zoning
that might prohibit completion (as when a developer already is building
houses when land is rezoned for commercial use). Lower courts have
concluded that a vested right can be a property interest and thus an
investment-backed expectation for purposes of Penn Central.242
What else might qualify as an investment-backed expectation? The
role of expectations arose in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,243 in which a
land owner challenged a Rhode Island law prohibiting filling coastal
wetlands. Prior to that decision, many state courts took the position that
a person who acquired land with knowledge of a regulatory restriction
could not claim a taking when the restriction was applied. Acquisition
with notice, the courts reasoned, precluded any reasonable expectation
of development.244 The Supreme Court rejected that view in Palazzolo.
If the restriction was a taking for the previous owner, it remained a taking when applied to the new owner: “[some] enactments are unreasonable and do not become less so through the passage of time or title . . .
A State would be allowed, in effect, to put an expiration date on the
Takings Clause. This ought not to be the rule.”245 This was enough to decide a key issue in the case: the pre-existing restriction on filling coastal
wetlands did not defeat Palazzolo’s takings claim and the case was remanded for consideration under Penn Central.246
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor offered her views concerning the relevance of a pre-existing restriction to a Penn Central
analysis:
Today’s holding does not mean that the timing of the regulation’s enactment relative
to the acquisition of title is immaterial to the Penn Central analysis . . . Under [Penn
Central] interference with investment-backed expectations is one of a number of
factors that a court must examine. Further, the regulatory regime in place at the time

240. E.g., W. Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980).
241. E.g., Va. Code Ann. § 15.2-2307 (2009).
242. See, e.g., Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury Twp., 808 F.2d 1023, 1033 (3d Cir.
1987) (suggesting that a vested right is a property interest and thus a “distinct investment backed expectation” for purposes of Penn Central).
243. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
244. See id. at 613.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 632.
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the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to shape the reasonableness of those
expectations.247

She concluded: “[c]ourts properly consider the effect of existing regulations under the rubric of investment-backed expectations in determining whether a compensable taking has occurred.”248 Justice O’Connor
linked investment-backed expectations to the fairness concerns that she
thought underlie the regulatory takings analysis.249 Under this view,
the concept of a “reasonable” investment-backed expectation refers to
something that can be less than a property interest but must be more
than a unilateral desire; it is an objectively reasonable expectation of
how a person might use his property.250 Justice O’Connor specifically
noted that this reasonable expectation could arise “without vesting any
kind of development right in the property owner.”251
Justice O’Connor’s views on investment-backed expectations were
endorsed in the majority opinion in Tahoe-Sierra.252 In Tahoe-Sierra,
the landowners argued that the planning agency’s lengthy moratorium
on all development in affected areas around Lake Tahoe amounted to a
per se taking for the period of the moratorium. The Court rejected this
view, thereby declining to expand the settings in which a per se takings
rule would apply. Instead, the Court signaled its support for the factspecific case by case approach of Penn Central.253 It singled out for approval Justice O’Connor’s Palazzolo language concerning fairness and
the role of the regulatory environment in shaping investment-backed
expectations.254 The Tahoe-Sierra Court noted that the precise question

247. Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
248. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635-36.
249. Id. at 633.
250. See id. at 634-35. Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion took the opposite view: a
pre-existing restriction “should have no bearing upon the determination of whether the
restriction is so substantial as to constitute a taking.” A person is not expected to take
into account “the assumed validity of a restriction that . . . deprives property of so much
of its value as to be unconstitutional.” Id. at 637 (Scalia, J. concurring). Of the two, Justice O’Connor’s view seems more representative of how a reasonable developer might
think: given the cost and unpredictability of litigation, it seems safer to assume that a
restriction is valid than to assume the opposite. Justice Scalia’s view has the appeal of
greater logical purity. The courts tend to follow Justice O’Connor. Appolo Fuels, Inc. v.
United States, 381 F.3d 1338, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States,
No. 96-237 L, 2004 U.S. Claims Lexis 359 (Fed. Cl. 2004); see also Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005-06 (1984) (stating reasonable investment-backed
expectations “must be more than a ‘unilateral expectation or an abstract need’ ”).
251. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 635.
252. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
253. Id. at 320-21.
254. Id. at 335.
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in Palazzolo (the temporal relationship between regulatory enactments
and the acquisition of title) was not before it but it endorsed the concept
of an analysis focusing on fairness and justice in each case.255
A few years later in Lingle, though, the Court (through Justice
O’Connor again) suggested that perhaps the definition of investmentbacked expectations should be narrowed to quasi-property rights: “[t]he
Penn Central inquiry turns in large part, albeit not exclusively, upon the
magnitude of a regulation’s economic impact and the degree to which it
interferes with legitimate property interests.”256
With this limited and somewhat unclear guidance, the lower courts
seem to give weight to investment-backed expectations if the landowner
committed resources to development, when that action was reasonable
in light of the facts (such as the property and its surroundings, and their
suitability for development) and the regulatory climate existing at the
time of investment.257 The Palazzolo case on remand provides an unusually well-considered example. The Rhode Island court considered
whether a residential development on Palazzolo’s land would be likely
to be successful, noting Palazzolo’s lack of experience in real estate
development and the lack of other residential subdivisions in the area.258
The court emphasized the great expense associated with building houses
in a marsh.259 The court noted that Rhode Island had never consented
to filling the marshland on Palazzolo’s parcel and that Palazzolo’s title
to the property “is clearly subject to the public trust doctrine,” so that
Palazzolo’s “reasonable investment-backed expectations must be measured against the premise that the one-half of Plaintiff’s property which
lies below mean high water can never be filled absent state approval.”260
Finally, the court referred to the “growing nationwide movement toward the preservation of ecologically valuable sites during the last half
of the twentieth century,” including various Rhode Island enactments
prohibiting filling wetlands of which Palazzolo was aware.261 Thus the
court on remand looked for overall indicia of reasonable expectations,

255. Id. at 335-36.
256. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
257. For an interesting survey of how state courts have handled this concept, see
J. David Breemer, Playing the Expectations Game: When Are Investment-Backed Land
Use Expectations (Un)reasonable in State Courts?, 38 Urb. Law. 81 (2006).
258. Palazzolo v. State, No. WM 88-0297, 2005 WL 1645974 at *12 (R.I. Super.
Ct. Jul. 5, 2005).
259. Id. at *13.
260. Id.
261. Id. at *14 n.78.
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without seeming to consider whether those expectations needed to be
strong enough to amount to a property interest.
What, then, can one say about an urban garden zone? What is the
expectation with which it might interfere? We know that, as a general
rule, Cleveland may change the zoning of a parcel without compensating the owner for any change in value. In the absence of a vested right,
no person has a property interest in unchanged zoning.262 If we assume
that the city rezones untenanted private land previously designated for
residential, commercial, or industrial use as an urban garden, we have to
consider whether this interferes with an owner’s reasonable expectation
of development. Lucas suggests that, in general, a person has a right to
expect to be able to build something—that the deprivation of the right
to build any permanent structure looks like a taking. But the agricultural
zoning cases remind us that the courts are willing to accept zoning that
allows productive use without requiring that the use allow actual construction of buildings.
Thus we must consider the likely specific circumstances of an urban
garden site in a shrinking city. We must assume that the city plans to
rezone land for urban gardens only where it concludes that the specific
parcel does not have a reasonable prospect of more intensive development in the foreseeable future. This is the policy expressed in ReImagining. Moreover, the city’s judgment is likely to be supported by
the overall climate of a shrinking city, in which there is more land available than is needed to supply current or foreseeable future development.
True, even today speculators are purchasing lots in Cleveland by the
dozens on the theory that they might prove valuable in the future, but
it is notable that many of these are out-of-state individuals unfamiliar
with Cleveland.263 Under these circumstances, it is likely that the city
could present a strong case that reasonable expectations of future development of a particular parcel must be modest or non-existent.
Could a city sustain an urban garden zone if the market for land undergoes a dramatic change in the future? At this point we would be
even farther into the realm of speculation, and it is possible that the
city would change its mind and, after appropriate public hearings, rezone the parcel. If it does not, the agricultural zoning cases suggest
that an urban garden district could resist an expectations-based takings

262. E.g., Zanghi v. Bd. of Appeals, 807 N.E.2d 221, 226 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004);
see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (property owners must
expect that land use regulations will change over time).
263. Kotlowitz, supra note 29.
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challenge even if development pressures increase. Indeed, many agricultural zoning cases are decided in the face of pressure for more intense development—a pressure that agricultural zoning is specifically
intended to resist.264
c. Character of Regulation
The final factor in the Penn Central analysis is the “character of the government action.” The meaning of this is not clear in Penn Central, nor
has the Court clarified it on any subsequent occasion. Commentators
acknowledge that it is something of a mystery.265 In Penn Central itself,
the Court characterized this factor as follows: “A ‘taking’ may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by Government . . . than when interference
arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.”266
This language suggests that the only issue is whether the government
has engaged in some form of a physical invasion. It is possible that this
is all the Court meant, because apparently it derived its reference to
“character” from the Causby case, where the term was used to refer to a
physical invasion of an owner’s property.267 Only a few years after Penn
Central, the Loretto case held that such an invasion would be a per se
taking.268 If the Penn Central character factor has any meaning today, it
must be elsewhere.
Later in Penn Central, the Court states that “Government actions that
may be characterized as acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate
uniquely public functions have often been held to constitute ‘takings,’ ”
citing the Causby case again.269 In Causby, the United States landed

264. Cordes, supra note 169, at 1033-34; see, e.g., Harvard State Bank v. County of
McHenry, 620 N.E. 2d 1360, 1363 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (agricultural zoning defended as
a buffer against suburban encroachment).
265. E.g., Michael B. Kent, Jr., Construing the Canon: An Exegesis of Regulatory
Takings Jurisprudence After Lingle v. Chevron, 16 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 63, 101 (2008);
see also R. S. Radford, Just a Flesh Wound? The Impact of Lingle v. Chevron on Regulatory Takings Law, 38 Urb. Law. 437, 448 (2006) (“What considerations might reasonably be included in the ‘character’ calculus remains as great a mystery today as the
day Penn Central was drafted.”).
266. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citation
omitted).
267. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946) (“As stated in United States v.
Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328, [itself a case involving physical invasion by floodwater,] it is
the character of the invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the
damage is substantial, that determines the question whether it is a taking.”).
268. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
269. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 128.
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military aircraft at a nearby airport by flying low over the claimant’s
land, frightening the chickens and disrupting the lives of the owners.
The Supreme Court agreed with the court of claims that the government
had in effect taken an easement over the property.270
Still later in the Penn Central opinion, the Court notes that the Penn
Central plaintiffs describe Causby as an instance in which “Government, acting in an enterprise capacity, has appropriated part of their
property for some strictly governmental purpose.”271 The Court rejected
this suggestion:
Apart from the fact that Causby was a case of invasion of airspace that destroyed
the use of the farm beneath and this New York City law has in nowise impaired the
present use of the Terminal, the Landmarks Law neither exploits appellants’ parcel
for city purposes nor facilitates nor arises from any entrepreneurial operations of the
city.272

The Court thus disagreed with the notion that the application of the
New York landmark law to Grand Central Station was an action in an
enterprise capacity; the Court did not disagree with the suggestion that
an action in an enterprise capacity might have a particularly dubious
character.273
These two descriptions of the character factor—the acquisition of resources for “uniquely public functions” and the appropriation of property to help a government in an “enterprise capacity”—have slightly
different implications. The first might apply to a green space designa-

270. Causby, 328 U.S. at 267. The Court described the facts as follows:
[The airplanes] come close enough at times to appear barely to miss the tops of the
trees and at times so close to the tops of the trees as to blow the old leaves off. The
noise is startling. And at night the glare from the planes brightly lights up the place.
As a result of the noise, respondents had to give up their chicken business. As many
as six to ten of their chickens were killed in one day by flying into the walls from
fright. The total chickens lost in that manner was about 150. Production also fell off.
The result was the destruction of the use of the property as a commercial chicken
farm. Respondents are frequently deprived of their sleep and the family has become
nervous and frightened.
Id. at 259.
271. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 135.
272. Id.
273. The Causby Court rested its finding of a taking on the concept of a physical
intrusion:
The superadjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the land that continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land itself. We think that the
landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it
are in the same category as invasions of the surface.
Causby, 328 U.S. at 265. Causby itself does not include any language using an “enterprise capacity” theory, and indeed it did not need to, as the finding of a physical intrusion was sufficient.
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tion for property, when the purpose is flood control to benefit the public.
Although the government always regulates in the public interest, this restriction is particularly severe and in effect dedicates the land to a public
purpose, with no room for private use (other than recreational strolls
when the premises are not flooded). Perhaps this is an action of questionable “character,” though this does not add much to our understanding: in this instance we need not reach the issue of character because, as
discussed below, this looks like a Lucas per se taking.
The second (enterprise capacity) might apply when a government
undertakes a function that might have been handled privately, such as
when a government builds a convention center. As an example, assume
a city builds a convention center and then realizes that it has not built
enough parking spaces to serve the center. In order to solve this problem, the city zones vacant land adjacent to the center “parking lot only.”
Although the rezoning might survive substantive due process scrutiny
because it is rationally related to a legitimate public purpose (promoting
urban development by facilitating the use of a convention center), and
the land may well retain significant economic value as a parking lot,
something about the character of the action seems like a taking. The city
has used its governmental power to obtain parking capacity for its new
convention center without paying for it.
In this latter “enterprise capacity” setting, some have argued that the
government’s action always looks like a taking. Indeed, it is possible
that the Penn Central litigants were thinking of an influential article
by Prof. Joseph Sax in which he presented this argument.274 However,
this enterprise capacity theory does not seem to have been adopted or
endorsed in any reported decisions.275
The most recent mention of character is in the Lingle decision. As
noted earlier, Lingle pared away from the taking analysis an element
that had confused it for some time: the suggestion in some of the cases
that a regulation can be a taking if it fails to substantially advance a
legitimate state purpose.276 The Lingle Court stated that this is a factor
related to due process concerns, not a taking:

274. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 62-63 (1964);
see also Carlos A. Ball, The Curious Intersection of Nuisance and Takings Law, 86
B.U. L. Rev. 819, 844 (2006) (“when the government competes for resources, it is more
likely to overreach than when it arbitrates the use of resources by others . . . because
there is an incentive in the former circumstance to acquire resources without having to
pay for them”).
275. The concept is mentioned in Coast Range Conifers, LLC v. State, 117 P.3d 990,
995 n.10 (Or. 2005), but without success for its advocates.
276. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 541 (2005).
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In stark contrast to the three regulatory takings tests discussed above [Loretto, Lucas,
and Penn Central], the “substantially advances” inquiry reveals nothing about the
magnitude or character of the burden a particular regulation imposes upon private
property rights. Nor does it provide any information about how any regulatory burden is distributed among property owners. In consequence, this test does not help to
identify those regulations whose effects are functionally comparable to government
appropriation or invasion of private property; it is tethered neither to the text of the
Takings Clause nor to the basic justification for allowing regulatory actions to be
challenged under the Clause.277

By removing the “substantially advances” component from the takings
analysis, the Court suggests that we are not concerned with the strength
of the public interest the regulation serves; we are only concerned with
the magnitude and distribution of the burden the regulation imposes.278
Perhaps this is what Lingle tells us “character” means: an action with
a greater or more unfair burden on use looks more like a taking, even
apart from its actual economic impact.279 This interpretation might support a challenge to an Urban Garden District designation. The argument
would be that by zoning land for an urban garden, the government is in
effect taking it for the public purpose of fostering community gardens.
If government wants local residents to join together to garden, let the
government offer this option on public land. The burden of an Urban
Garden zone is significant because it is highly restrictive and much
more restrictive than the zoning of adjacent properties, which could be
zoned for residential or other development uses. Even if the property
had virtually no value at the outset, the “character” of this burden is
perhaps distinctively onerous.
This is an argument that could find a sympathetic audience. After
all, why should one urban land owner be limited to garden uses, while
his neighbors may build houses? At first glance, the agricultural zoning
cases seem to provide a response: the courts overwhelmingly uphold
zoning land for agricultural uses, when a reasonable governmental purpose is at least fairly debatable. The mere restriction of a property to
agricultural use is not fatal. Upon closer examination, the strength of
this argument dims somewhat because most types of agricultural zoning also allow construction of single family residences, although at very

277. Id. at 543.
278. For an argument that Lingle has made the character element irrelevant, see
Dale A. Whitman, Deconstructing Lingle: Implications for Takings Doctrine, 40 J. Marshall L. Rev. 573 (2007).
279. The concept of unfairness has the flavor of an equal protection argument. It
would be unfortunate if Lingle, after striving to remove substantive due process from
the takings analysis, were to bring in a confusing equal protection element.
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low densities, or the possibility of other uses by special exception.280
Nonetheless, this additional opportunity for development makes a difference in very few cases, so it does not completely undercut the value
of the agricultural zoning example. In addition, courts have upheld agricultural zones that allow only agriculture and no other uses.281
A more significant drawback is that virtually none of the agricultural
zoning cases go beyond a simple Lucas-type inquiry to a Penn Central analysis, so they do not tell us how the character concept might be
handled.282 As noted earlier, most of them simply say that the property
retains value for agriculture. One exception in this regard is Gardner
v. New Jersey Pinelands Commission,283 which considers the application of Penn Central to New Jersey’s protection of an area called the
Pinelands. The complexities of the state’s comprehensive Pinelands
protection plan are not important here; the pertinent point is that the
plaintiff wanted to subdivide farmland for residences and alleged that
the state’s refusal to allow such development was a taking. The New
Jersey court’s Penn Central analysis was relatively sparse; here it is in
its entirety:
Plaintiff’s claim fails under the Penn Central analysis. The CMP does not change
or prohibit an existing use of the land when applied to plaintiff’s farm. Like Penn
Central, plaintiff may continue the existing, admittedly beneficial use of the property.
Further, although whether Penn Central could again make use of all of its property,
particularly the airspace over its terminal, was unclear, plaintiff may gainfully use
all of his property, including the right to build five homes clustered together on the
restricted land. There also is no showing that the economic impact of the regulations
interferes with distinct investment-backed expectations. In addition, Penn Central
could offset its loss by transferring valuable property rights to other properties, even
if such transfers did not fully compensate it. Plaintiff possesses the similar right to
offsetting benefits; it may receive Pinelands Development Credits in return for recording the deed restrictions. Finally, there is no invidious or arbitrary unfairness in
the application of the regulatory scheme. Gardner’s neighbors in Uplands Agricultural Areas are burdened by exactly the same restrictions, and other landowners in the

280. See, e.g., Bell River Assocs. v. China Charter Twp, 565 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1997) (agricultural uses include single family homes as well as other special uses
allowed by permission).
281. In many cases, the court does not specify whether uses in addition to agriculture are allowed. Some cases expressly approve exclusively agricultural zones. See
Gisler v. County of Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (Ct. App. 1974); Wilson v. County of
McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (160 acre lot minimum); Chokecherry
Hills Estates, Inc. v. Deuel County, 294 N.W.2d 654 (S.D. 1980); see also Joyce v.
City of Portland, 546 P.2d 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (holding no taking occurred when
agricultural use was still permitted).
282. This might be explained by the relative antiquity of many of the cases, some
of which were decided before Penn Central, and most of which were decided before
Lingle.
283. Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm’n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991).
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Pinelands must abide by comparable regulations as part of an integrated comprehensive plan designed to benefit both the region and the public.284

This analysis does focus on the unfairness concern in the portion that
arguably concerns “character” and notes that the plaintiff suffers from
the scheme no more than his neighbors. An urban garden plot owner
might argue that he is different; he alone (or relatively alone, because
the city plans a network of urban gardens) bears the urban garden district restriction.
When a court evaluates a taking it does not look at the uses or value
that have been prohibited; it considers the uses or value that remain,
and asks whether the owner retains sufficient use or value that there has
been no regulatory taking.285 If the city can show that the use of the land
for urban gardens offers a viable economic use to the owner, the city can
argue that the zoning is not unduly restrictive. Although neighboring
properties might be zoned for business or housing, it is a fact of life in
zoning that different districts allow different uses; a community garden
inevitably will be located adjacent to other, more intensive uses.286
This response is somewhat unsatisfactory from an intellectual perspective because it says, in essence, that the character of the restriction
does not matter because not all value has been taken. Yet it seems consistent with the broader concept of a regulatory taking as functionally
equivalent to government confiscation: as long as some economically
viable private use remains, the owner has suffered regulation, not a taking.
3. GREEN SPACE ZONING

All of the takings arguments become much stronger, of course, for
land that is zoned for green space. The Re-Imagining report discusses a
range of possible “green infrastructure” uses, including parks and public green space, stormwater management areas, and wildlife habitat.287
To some extent, green space and development might be compatible.
If a portion of a parcel can be developed in some manner, while leaving sufficient unpaved area for stormwater management or habitat, arguably we are in a Penn Central setting. As the Penn Central Court

284. Id. at 261 (citations omitted).
285. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
286. See, e.g., Puritan-Greenfield Improvement Ass’n v. Leo, 153 N.W.2d 162,
170-71 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (noting that adjacency to more intensive uses is “characteristic” of the end of one zoning district and the beginning of another). For another
analysis of the “character” concept, see Christopher T. Goodin, The Role and Content
of the Character of the Governmental Action Factor in a Partial Regulatory Takings
Analysis, 29 U. Haw. L. Rev. 437 (2007).
287. Re-Imagining supra note 18, at 8.
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explained, when evaluating a taking we look at the parcel as a whole;
if not all of a parcel is restricted, there is not a total taking.288 In that
instance the takings analysis would be similar to that above, though
with the added chore of identifying the relevant parcel for the “parcel
as a whole.”289
If any of the green space options preclude any form of economic activity, they look much more like a taking under Lucas. If none of a parcel of property can be developed because it is designated as a retention
basin for stormwater management or a wildlife habitat, the property
has no value to the owner. All of the property’s value has been taken
for a public purpose and the Lucas argument is particularly strong. The
Lucas majority noted that regulations requiring land “to be left substantially in its natural state” carry “a heightened risk that private property
is being pressed into some form of public service. . . .”290
For this reason it is highly unlikely that the city would attempt to
zone any land that is privately held for exclusive use as “green infrastructure.” Any such rezoning on private land would be vulnerable to
attack as a taking.
B. Spot Zoning and Equal Protection Objections
to an Urban Garden Zone
The above discussion focuses on takings law because it is an obvious
issue when a city downzones land to a use such as an urban garden. The
discussion necessarily includes references to another potential legal
challenge to an urban garden zone: the argument that the zoning power
has not been exercised rationally and does not satisfy the “fairly debatable” standard. Other legal arguments that might arise stem from the
concept of unfairness. These are the state law argument that an urban
garden zone might be unlawful “spot zoning,” and a state or federal
constitutional argument that singling out one parcel for rezoning might
be an equal protection violation.

288. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31. The Court explained:
“Taking” jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking,
this Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on the nature and
extent of the interference with rights in parcel as a whole—here, the city tax block
designated as the “landmark site.”
Id.
289. See, e.g., Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 208 F.3d 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (evaluating the appropriate parcel for purposes of a takings analysis).
290. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992).

Urban Agriculture

275

Litigants raise the challenge of “spot zoning” when they think that
one parcel has been singled out for different zoning treatment than the
areas around it.291 Usually the parcel has been rezoned to a more intensive use than that of its neighbors, such as a large apartment building
allowed in a single family home district. Rezoning to a less intensive
use (as in the urban garden setting) can be called “reverse spot zoning.”
The concept has a visual element: a small tract rezoning will show up
on a zoning map as a visible “spot,” surrounded by other, different uses.
Spot zoning is not always unlawful; rather, the existence of small tract
rezoning is the starting point for a court’s analysis of whether the rezoning complies with zoning laws, including the SZEA’s concept that
a municipality’s overall zoning scheme must be in accord with a “comprehensive plan.”292 In addition, of course, the spot zoning must survive
the “fairly debatable” standard.293
A tract of land with the urban garden zoning designation runs the risk
of looking like a spot on the Cleveland zoning map. (Of course, if the
city carries out its plan of fostering a large number of urban gardens, the
zoning map might appear to be dotted with such spots.) The city would
have to defend the zone by demonstrating that, rather than an aberration,
the urban garden zones have been mapped on the basis of a comprehensive plan; that the rezoning does not adversely affect the neighbors; and
that each zone has been selected on the basis of a rational factual finding
that the land and location are suitable for the zoning.294
An equal protection challenge takes the spot zoning concept (“this
tract has been treated differently from others around it”) and clothes
it in constitutional garb. Here the argument would be that selection of
a particular tract as an urban garden zone is a form of discrimination.

291. See Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 1, at 242.
292. Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 3, reprinted in Mandelker, supra note 1,
at 4.16. Courts generally consider factors such as the impact of the use as rezoned on the
surrounding area, the size of the area or number of owners benefited, and whether the
rezoning is consistent with a comprehensive plan. Compare Greater Yellowstone Coal.,
Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs., 25 P.3d 168, 172 (Mont. 2001) (small tract rezoning
unlawful) with Smith v. City of Papillion, 705 N.W.2d 584, 599 (Neb. 2005) (small tract
rezoning upheld).
293. See Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 1, at 242.
294. Spot zoning cases do not appear to be frequently litigated in Ohio. The Ohio
Supreme Court has defined spot zoning as “the singling out of a lot or a small area
for discriminatory or different treatment from that accorded surrounding land which is
similar in character.” Willott v. Vill. of Beachwood, 197 N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ohio 1964).
Following the lead of this case (which held that an 80-acre tract rezoning was not a
“spot”), the Ohio courts appear to apply a fairly simple test based on the Willott description. See, e.g., Menges v. Sugarcreek, No. 89AP070059, 1989 Ohio Ct. App. LEXIS
4825, at *1-3 (Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1989).
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Under Supreme Court doctrine, however, economic discrimination in
this form need survive only a “rational basis” test: such a statutory classification is valid if there is “any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”295 For all of the
reasons detailed above, the city is likely to be able to survive an equal
protection challenge.296
C. Brownfields in the Shrinking City
One final issue must be identified, although it is not a land use issue in
the narrow sense. The soil in Cleveland displays its urban and industrial
heritage, as urban soils commonly are compromised by the presence
of petrochemicals, lead or other contaminants. Some of these so-called
“brownfield” sites are old industrial areas with significant contamination
that merit a structured and comprehensive cleanup; many are relatively
mildly contaminated, as a side effect of being located in an aging urban
area. It is virtually impossible to place a price tag on such remediation,
as it depends on the nature and extent of the contamination, so the practical impact of the issue is uncertain. The Re-Imagining report includes
concern about remediation, noting that “environmental contaminants
abound in places where development demand is very limited or in some
cases, non-existent.”297 This is a significant observation because, as ReImagining points out, “[r]esources for cleaning up brownfields sites are
typically tied to new development projects.”298 Indeed, our legal structure for cleaning up contaminated sites rests in large part on the use
of private funding or—more recently—public funding available where
there is a likelihood that a cleaned-up site can offer economic development benefits. Thus the shrinking city faces another hurdle: a prospective “green” use probably requires cleanup of contaminants to the
maximum extent appropriate to protect human health and the environment, but the resources available to the shrinking city are limited.
A comprehensive review of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper,
but in general the federal contaminated site cleanup program depends on

295. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); see Blust v. City of
Blue Ash, 894 N.E.2d 89, 94 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (offering that a comparable rational
basis test applies under state law in Ohio); see also Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416
U.S. 1 (1974) (upholding a restriction on boarding houses as having a rational basis).
296. The Equal Protection argument gains greater weight if the plaintiff can allege
and show a racial motivation in selecting a particular parcel of land, thereby triggering strict scrutiny of the classification. Juergensmeyer & Roberts, supra note 1, at
10.14.A (2007).
297. Re-Imagining, supra note 18, at 24.
298. Id.
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private funding: it imposes cleanup liability on an array of individuals
who can be linked to the hazardous substances contaminating a particular site.299 This liability structure was imposed under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
in 1980.300 Decades of CERCLA litigation ensued as each of these “potentially responsible parties” (PRPs) sought to find as many other PRPs
as possible, to fund the cleanup of these severely contaminated sites. In
addition, fear of liability under CERCLA added to disincentives to invest
in older industrial sites in cities such as Cleveland: rather than run the
risk of acquiring an environmental catastrophe, developers and industry
would seek out untouched “greenfield” sites at the edge of town.301
This effect of CERCLA (whether real or only perceived)302 prompted
concern about the fate of “brownfields”—industrial sites that were not
clean, but that also were not so severely contaminated as to merit an
EPA-mandated CERCLA cleanup.303 After initial resistance, during the

299. Federal cleanups occur under the auspices of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, or “CERCLA” the so-called Superfund
law. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9628 (2010). The statute imposes liability on the entities that
generated the hazardous substances or arranged for disposal of substances they owned
or possessed; those who transported hazardous substances to a disposal site they selected; and the current or past owners or operators of the site at which the hazardous
substances were found. § 9607(a). Current owners and operators of the site are liable
unless they can qualify for an exemption; past owners and operators are liable only if
they owned or operated “at the time of disposal.” Id. All categories of potentially responsible parties benefit from only very limited defenses: they must be able to show that
the contamination is caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or the act or omission
of a third party under very limited circumstances. § 9607(b).
300. §§ 9601-9628.
301. See, e.g., Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields at Twenty: A Critical Reevaluation, 34
Fordham Urb. L.J. 721, 730-35 (2007) (describing this as the “brownfields story” and
questioning its accuracy). Although there is an “innocent purchaser” defense for the
purchaser who conducts a Phase I and finds nothing, the defense is so surrounded by
conditions that the prudent investor would seek to avoid the risk of liability; in addition, the “innocent purchaser” defense in its original form offered no protection to the
purchaser whose Phase I detected the presence of contamination. Faith R. Dylewski,
Comment, Ohio’s Brownfield Problem and Possible Solutions: What is Required for
A Successful Brownfield Initiative?, 35 Akron L. Rev. 81 (2001).
302. See Eisen, supra note 301, at 730-35.
303. CERCLA, as amended, defines a brownfields site as “real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential
presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.” § 9601(39)(A). Sites that
are the subject to mandatory CERCLA removal actions or listed on the CERCLA National Priorities List of severely contaminated sites are not eligible for “brownfield” status under federal law. § 9601(39)(B). Some commentators object that state brownfields
programs have come to include sites that should have been subject to a more formal
mandatory cleanup. E.g., David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs as Laboratories
of Democracy?, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 86, 92-93 (2005). In addition to CERCLA,
many states passed their own environmental cleanup laws that followed the CERCLA
pattern. See Dylewski, supra note 301, at 91.
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1990s the federal EPA began to consider making accommodations to
purchasers of brownfield sites,304 and in 2002 Congress enacted amendments to the statute, the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act.305 The goal was to foster redevelopment: as EPA’s
brownfields program description asserts, “Cleaning up and reinvesting
in these properties protects the environment, reduces blight, and takes
development pressures off greenspaces and working lands.”306 The legislation included new liability protections for purchasers of property
with known contamination who agree to cooperate with a cleanup action.307 The law also provided a defense to liability for a government
entity that acquired a brownfield property involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, or abandonment, or by exercising its power of
eminent domain, as long as the local government was not responsible
for the contamination at the site and the site was not subject to an EPAmandated CERCLA cleanup.308 Both of these changes helped to diminish the fear that acquiring a brownfield would be a source of financial
disaster for the new landowner; liability of other PRPs associated with
the site remained unchanged.
1. STATE BROWNFIELD PROGRAMS

In the meantime, states were taking the lead with their own programs
to encourage reuse of brownfields.309 A key feature of these programs
was an effort to encourage voluntary private action to clean up mildly
contaminated sites: unlike CERCLA with its threat of sweeping liability, these laws rely on carrots, not sticks.310 States wanted to encourage productive reuse of old industrial sites, and they designed their

304. See Jonathan D. Weiss, The Clinton Administration’s Brownfields Initiative,
in Brownfields: A Comprehensive Guide to Redeveloping Contaminated
Property 41 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997). The EPA program is
also described in Dylewski, supra note 301, at 99-103 (article written before the 2002
amendments to CERCLA).
305. §§ 9604-9605, 9607, 9622, 9628.
306. EPA.gov, Brownfields and Land Revitalization, http://www.epa.gov/brown
fields/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
307. § 9601(40).
308. § 9601(20)(D), (35)(A)(ii).
309. See Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, Legislative Innovation in State Brownfields
Development Programs, 16 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 1, 61 (2001) (includes list of state
brownfields statutes).
310. E.g., Dana, supra note 303, at 86, 107 n.2 (“In popular and academic commentary, the term brownfields is sometimes used to cover all voluntary cleanups under
state statute that does not follow the CERCLA model . . .”). “Because developers engage voluntarily . . . they presumably lack culpability, and therefore, control the timing,
sequencing, and even the comprehensiveness of remediation and reuse.” Eisen, supra
note 301, at 721, 730
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brownfields programs to be developer-friendly: the voluntary cleanup
system is intended to provide technical assistance to the developer, to
encourage cleanup and productive (meaning tax-revenue-generating
and job-generating) reuse.311 Indeed, the programs have been criticized
for being too kind to developers, thereby exposing the public to environmental contaminants at redeveloped brownfields.312 They also have
been criticized for harboring overly-optimistic views of the development that might ensue.313
The voluntary brownfields process can be attractive to a private developer who wants to avoid surprises and undue expense. Usually it
includes the possibility of a lesser cleanup standard than the feared
CERCLA “edible and drinkable” level, by restricting the future use of
the land.314 Thus, for example, a state could restrict property to industrial or commercial use, and prohibit residential development.315 Instead
of fully cleaning the soil or groundwater, the state could allow the developer to use physical barriers designed to reduce human exposure
to the site, such as fencing, pavement, or an impervious cap covering
the contaminated soil.316 State brownfields programs also allow for the
use of innovative cleanup techniques (including research into bioremediation) because they are not subject to the restrictive standards of
CERCLA.317
State voluntary cleanup programs are not particularly hospitable to
the urban gardener. They rely on attracting industrial or commercial
developers who can pay for the cleanup, with the hope of subsequent
profitable redevelopment of the property. At their inception, these laws

311. See Eisen, supra note 301, at 721 (a basic principle of a redevelopment program
which provides incentives for remediation and redevelopment).
312. Id. at 732, n.60 (criticizing the programs of many states, and especially New
Jersey, for being overly “developer-centered”); Dana, supra note 303, at 87-88, 93-94
(criticizing state programs for including severely contaminated sites in their brownfields voluntary cleanups, noting that inadequate cleanup can lead to reuse of sites that
increase human exposures).
313. Eisen, supra note 301, at 733-34.
314. E.g. id. at 736-37; see also Robertson, supra note 309, at 4-5 (noting that many
states have allowed cleanup to vary depending on the future use of the land).
315. See Robertson, supra note 309, at 8-9.
316. The plan also could include an institutional control such as a deed restriction
on reuse prohibiting future residential development, a local zoning restriction, or some
other administrative or legal tool to prevent public exposure to contaminants. A Citizen’s Guide to Understanding Institutional Controls at Superfund, Brownfields, Federal
Facilities, Underground Storage Tank, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Cleanups, U.S. EPA (Office of Solid Wastes and Emergency Response Feb. 2005). Robertson, supra note 309, at 15-16 (criticizing reliance on institutional controls or lesser
cleanup standards).
317. See Dana, supra note 303, at 96 n.32.
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were concerned with redevelopment and were not focused on a goal of
producing a clean environment for its own sake.
An additional issue for the shrinking city is that many green uses
are unlikely to be eligible for relaxed cleanup standards. Ohio’s Voluntary Action Program, for example, would require land used for urban
farming to be cleaned up to residential standards—the strictest standard
of cleanup.318 Few of us would feel comfortable purchasing vegetables
from an urban garden that was on soil not cleaned up to the most stringent environmental standards. Some urban gardeners seek to avoid the
soil issue by building raised beds on impervious surfaces such as parking lots: the vegetables grow in a combination of mulch and topsoil with
the parking lot beneath.319 There is also considerable interest in urban
greenhouses, which similarly should not require full cleanup of underlying soils.320 But for any urban gardener who wishes to use the native
soil, the contamination problem can be significant.
2. HOW DO WE PAY FOR CLEANUP
IN A SHRINKING CITY?

Traditionally, both CERCLA and state voluntary cleanup laws relied
heavily on private funding. CERCLA imposes liability on private persons who can be held responsible for contamination; state voluntary
cleanup programs enlist the help of private entities who want to clean
up properties with the expectation of profitable redevelopment. Over
time, however, it became apparent that private funding would not always be available and that the public needed to play some role. Thus
both the federal government, through the 2002 CERCLA amendments,
and various state programs began to offer sources of public funding.
Much of this funding is linked to the profitable redevelopment of the
contaminated property, but there are exceptions: both the federal gov-

318. See Ohio Admin. Code 3745:300-08(A), (C); :300-11(A), (D) (2010).
319. See Gather ‘Round Farm; Urban Gardens, http://gatherroundfarm.webs.com
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
320. For example, one project in Cleveland would establish a significant urban
greenhouse, using an employee-owned cooperative model:
Another cooperative in development ($10 million in federal loans and grants already in hand) is Green City Growers, which will build and operate a year-round hydroponic food production greenhouse in the midst of urban Cleveland. The 230,000square-foot greenhouse—larger than the average Wal-Mart superstore—will be
producing more than 3 million heads of fresh lettuce and nearly a million pounds of
(highly profitable) basil and other herbs a year, and will almost certainly become the
largest urban food-producing greenhouse in the country.
Gar Alperovitz et al., The Cleveland Model, Nation (Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://
www.thenation.com/doc/20100301/alperowitz_et_al/single.
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ernment and Ohio offer the possibility of public funds for land intended
for green uses.
In the shrinking city setting, we can assume that many mildly contaminated properties are owned by the city or by persons who are not
capable of bearing the cost of cleanup. It is doubtful that a resident who
has defaulted on a mortgage, for example, can help pay for remediation.
A lender who forecloses on a contaminated property is not liable as an
“owner” under CERCLA.321 An urban farmer does not have deep pockets.
Cleveland has a rich heritage of an active nonprofit community focused
on community development,322 but the cost of cleanup can be daunting.
Thus the financial resources available to a shrinking city are limited:
it must look into its own pockets, or perhaps those of the state or federal governments. There is some chance of funding at the federal level.
For example, federal grant funds for site assessments and cleanup are
not necessarily tied to the prospect of redevelopment; EPA focuses on
benefits to human health and the environment, and benefit to the community.323 While many of the federal grant success stories feature traditional
redevelopment, one example celebrates the use of federal funds to clean
up and preserve a community garden in Sacramento, California,324 and
another describes restoring an estuarine environment.325
Of course, there is no guarantee that federal funds will be available,
and it is apparent that EPA favors projects that will lead to redevelopment. In announcing new grants this year, for example, EPA noted that
the grants “will stimulate and accelerate the pace of cleanup and redevelopment of brownfields sites, and will create jobs . . . Communities, states, and tribes need this now more than ever.”326 Even with the

321. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (E)(2002).
322. Lind, supra note 28, at 240.
323. Envtl. Prot. Agency, FY09 Guidelines for Brownfields Assessment Grants at
24-25, available at http://www.epa.gov/oswer/docs/grants/epa-oswer-oblr-08-07.pdf;
Envtl. Prot. Agency, FY09 Guidelines for Brownfields Revolving Loan Fund (RLF)
Grants at 16-17, available at http://www.epa.gov/oswer/docs/grants/epa-oswer-oblr08-09.pdf; Envtl. Prot. Agency, FY09 Guidelines for Brownfields Cleanup Grants at
25-26, available at http://www.epa.gov/oswer/docs/grants/epa-oswer-oblr-08-08.pdf.
324. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Capital Area Development Authority, CA: Cleanup
Grant (Aug. 2006), http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/success/sacramento_ca_BRAG.
pdf. Another cleanup effort was for a dog park. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Culver City, CA:
Petroleum Assessment and Cleanup Grants (Nov. 2008), http://www.epa.gov/brown
fields/success/culver_city_ca_brag.pdf.
325. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe, Sequim Bay, WA: Cleanup
Grant (Sept. 2008), http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/success/sequimbaywabrag.pdf
326. EPA to Award Nearly $112 Million in Grants For Cleanup, Land-Revitalization
Projects, 40 Env’t Rep. 1121 (May 15, 2009).
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infusion of additional funds from the 2009 stimulus package (for which
the twenty percent participation requirement for cleanup grants was
waived), however, EPA awarded grants to 252 applicants out of about
700 grant applications.327
State-funded cleanup programs might offer funding opportunities,
although they tend to link funding to redevelopment.328 In Ohio, this
link is an element of the state’s major initiative, the Clean Ohio fund
program. The fund is created by public bonds issued by the state; it is
administered by the Clean Ohio Council, which is housed in the Ohio
Department of Development.329 Clean Ohio offers local governments
and nonprofit organizations330 grants and loans for brownfields investigation and cleanup.331 The statute specifies that the applicant must
describe the economic benefit that will result from cleaning up the
brownfield,332 and it authorizes the director of development to set priorities among the applicants.333

327. Id.; Analysis Says Economic Stimulus Package Offers Projects Broad Funding
Opportunities, 40 Env’t Rep. 428 (February 27, 2009); see also Bartsch, Increased
Funding, Flexibility, Simplicity Suggested for Brownfields Program, 37 Env’t Rep.
1975 (Sept. 22, 2006) (“Over the past two years, EPA has denied nearly 800 grant applications, including 460 cleanup grant proposals, because it did not have enough funding
to meet qualifying demand.”).
328. This restriction applies in Massachusetts. Mass Development, Brownfields
Redevelopment Fund, http://www.massdevelopment.com/financing/specialty-loanprograms/brownfields-redevelopment-fund/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2010); see Julianne
Kurdila & Elise Rindfleisch, Funding Opportunities for Brownfield Redevelopment, 34
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 479, 489-91 (2007); see also Mass. Dept. of Envtl. Prot.,
Brownfields Introduction, http://www.mass.gov/dep/cleanup/brint.htm (last visited
Mar. 31, 2010)
State brownfields program incentives are available to buyers, and sometimes sellers, of contaminated property provided there is a commitment to cleanup and redevelopment. . . . State incentives can help parties identify risk, limit liability, and fund
the cleanup of brownfields sites enabling their reuse for industry, housing, and other
purposes.
Id.
329. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 122.651(F) (LexisNexis 2010) (the Fund is housed
in the Department of Development; it also coordinates with Ohio EPA). The Clean
Ohio Fund has four major components: brownfield revitalization, farmland preservation, green space conservation, and recreational trails. The discussion in this paper focuses on the brownfield revitalization program, which is divided into two sections: the
revitalization fund and the assistance fund. See Clean Ohio Fund, http://clean.ohio.gov
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010).
330. Id. § 122.65(B) (listing “applicants” as including local government entities,
nonprofit organizations, and for-profit organizations that have entered into an agreement with a local government).
331. Id. § 122.656 (applications for grants for brownfields investigation); § 122.657
(describing criteria for applying for grants for investigation or cleanup).
332. Id. § 122.657(A)(8).
333. Id. § 122.657(D).
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As implemented, the Clean Ohio Fund selection mechanism favors
“economic benefit” as a key factor, and interprets “economic benefit” to
mean one thing: jobs.334 Unfortunately, it might be difficult for a smallscale urban farm or garden to demonstrate a high level of job creation.
Urban farm enthusiasts are optimistic that they can generate useful employment, if their plans bear fruit; this remains to be seen.335
Although economic benefit is only one of several elements for which
points are awarded in an application for Clean Ohio funds, as a practical
matter it can be quite significant: a score of zero for economic benefit
puts the applicant at a disadvantage.336 The Clean Ohio Fund is an $800

334. See Clean Ohio Fund, Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund Application for Funding: Guidance for Part B Known End User Track (May 2009), http://clean.ohio.
gov/BrownfieldRevitalization/Documents/CORF_ApplicationPage/CORF_PartB_
ScoringGuidanceKEU_052009.pdf; Clean Ohio Fund, Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund
Application for Funding: Guidance for Part B Redevelopment Ready Track (May
2009), http://clean.ohio.gov/BrownfieldRevitalization/Documents/CORF_Application
Page/CORF_PartB_ScoringGuidanceRRTrack_052009.pdf; Clean Ohio Fund, Clean
Ohio Assistance Fund Cleanup Application Section B (Mar. 2009), http://clean.ohio.
gov/BrownfieldRevitalization/Documents/FinalCOAF%20Cleanup%20Applica
tion%20Section%20B-Project%20Characteristics%20&%20Economic%20Bene
fit%20030609.doc.
335. Many urban farms are relatively small operations, operated by their owners.
One project underway in Cleveland—the Green City Growers urban greenhouse—
could provide a slightly higher number of jobs. It is part of a group of employee-owned
cooperative enterprises planned for the Cleveland inner city. Alperovitz, supra note
320. In addition, the Cuyahoga County Land Bank seeks to encourage urban agriculture as a workforce-training tool: “As compared to rural agriculture, urban agriculture
attempts to integrate [agricultural] activities into the urban economic and ecological
system. These linkages include the involvement of urban residents to meet labor needs
(workforce development) and the use of typical urban resources.” Cuyahoga Land
Bank, Demolition and Vacant Lot Re-Use, supra note 55. The proponents of an urban
farm in Detroit, Hantz City Growers, assert that urban farms could provide “hundreds”
of green jobs. See Hantz Farms Detroit, supra note 67 (discussing green jobs for local
residents).
336. The statutory language allows an argument that the Clean Ohio funds should be
available for redevelopment in the form of urban agriculture or urban gardening. The
statute itself does not define “economic benefit,” see Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 122.65
(LexisNexis 2010), and certainly does not restrict it to job creation. Both commercial
and community gardens confer an “economic benefit,” broadly defined, by providing a
source of food and, in the case of urban agriculture or market gardens, actual income
for the gardener. At this point, in the state’s view a community garden is not an economic benefit; it is a community benefit. But a shrinking city has a good argument that
development for urban gardening is a better alternative than simply letting the land sit,
contaminated and unused. This is particularly compelling in a city like Cleveland where
there are private entities (urban farmers and community development corporations) who
are willing to undertake or organize urban gardening, if the soil is clean.
The statutory argument is weaker for cleanup of contaminated property that is destined for ecological infrastructure such as flood plains. Here, it is more difficult to argue
that there is an economic benefit of the type the Clean Ohio statute might envision.
Fortunately for Cleveland, Ohio has a separate program that offers funding for improvements that protect waterways from nonpoint source pollution, such as polluted

284

The Urban Lawyer

Vol. 42, No. 2

Spring 2010

million bond fund, and all expenditures go through a competitive application process.337 The state has strong incentives to favor projects
with a clear and significant economic payback in the form of jobs. Ohio
and other states suffer from a chronic shortage of funds to deal with
environmental cleanup.338
In summary, shrinking cities confront a legacy of environmental contamination that they may have few ready resources to combat. Although
they may argue that their projects are eligible to compete for state or
federal funding for brownfield remediation, their appeals for funds may
be at a disadvantage when compared to projects that promise more lucrative reinvestment after cleanup.
IV. Conclusion

The problem of the shrinking city offers a fascinating variation on many
of the themes of land use law. For the past two hundred years our expectation has been growth, not shrinkage, and our land use system has been
focused on how to manage expansion, rather than decline. The regulatory system we have developed is sufficiently flexible to handle the

runoff. See Ohio.gov: Environmental Protection Agency, http://www.epa.state.oh.us/
defa/comguide.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (providing links to Ohio cleanup programs). Cleaning contaminated land could reduce contaminants in urban runoff. Other
land uses envisioned in Re-Imagining could be helpful in this regard also. Cities such as
Cleveland are spending hundreds of millions of dollars to combat problems with combined sewer overflows (CSO), in which stormwaters combine with sanitary sewer lines,
leading to overflows of untreated sewage into streams and lakes during wet weather. See
Northeast Ohio Regional Sewer District, What is a CSO?, http://www.neorsd.org/cso.
php (last visited Mar. 31, 2010). The CSO problem is caused in part by the high percentage of impervious surfaces in urban areas. See Re-Imagining, supra note 18.
Prior to urban settlement, the land in Cleveland was able to absorb much of the rain
as it fell. . . . As the city grew, the percentage of impervious surfaces such as streets,
sidewalks, and roofs . . . increased dramatically. . . . This prevents the natural absorption of stormwater and results in increased runoff and compromised water quality.
Id. at 20. Re-Imagining points out that planting trees on vacant lots would reduce stormwater runoff: “If done properly, this would reduce infrastructure costs and improve
water quality.” Id. at 11. Thus the re-greening of Cleveland could reduce the burden on
the region’s sewer systems and provide an alternative to the current practice of building additional water storage capacity and taking other mechanical measures to prevent
CSOs.
337. See Clean Ohio Fund, Welcome to the Clean Ohio Fund, http://clean.ohio.gov/
(last visited Mar. 31, 2010). For a detailed discussion of the Clean Ohio funds and other
funding mechanisms available in Ohio and other states, see Kurdila & Rindfleisch,
supra note 328.
338. As noted even before the current economic crisis began, “the dire budgetary
situation in many states appears to have stymied environmental enforcement, including
enforcement under CERCLA and mirror state CERCLA statutes.” Dana, supra note
303, at 88.
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challenge, but the shrinking city must pick its way carefully, offering
a documented and persuasive case for each decision to restrict future
development. A well-advised and careful city can reap the benefit of
judicial deference to local decision making and fend off challenges that
its restrictions amount to a taking of private property or are otherwise
unlawful as a matter of land use law. As a practical matter, however,
the shrinking city is likely to face difficulty in financing its efforts to
revitalize contaminated areas.

